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REGULAR TAKINGS OR REGULATORY TAKINGS?: 
LAND EXPROPRIATION IN RURAL CHINA 
Valerie Jaffee Washburn 
 Abstract: This article takes as its starting point the recent spate of unrest in rural 
China over government takings of rural, agricultural land.  Though the popular and 
scholarly press has paid a great deal of attention to this issue, few analyses have explored 
in depth the institutional and legal framework surrounding it.  This piece first attempts 
such an exploration and concludes that the underlying issues have as much to do with 
China's national land use regulatory system as they do with the behavior of local 
governments that seize privately-farmed land for other uses.  In fact, it is more productive 
to see this as a regulatory takings issue than an eminent domain issue.  With that analysis 
in mind, the article proceeds to explain why commonly-presented proposals for solving 
the rural takings problem are inadequate and then offers a novel solution based on the 
regulatory takings analysis:  granting individual farmers transferrable, monetizable land 
development rights that will be separable from the land use rights that are the basis of the 
current rural land ownership regime. 
I. INTRODUCTION   
 
In June of 2006, hundreds of Chinese farmers in the village of 
Sanzhou, Guangdong Province, armed with clubs and bottles of acid, held 
government officials and businesspeople hostage inside a newly-constructed 
apartment building for almost twenty-four hours.1  Earlier that year, police 
armed with electric batons clashed with over 1000 farmers wielding 
pitchforks outside the village of Panlong, also in Guangdong Province. 2  
The clash may have been responsible for the death of a thirteen-year-old girl, 
and as many as sixty people were wounded in the struggle.3  Just over a 
month before that, in nearby Dongzhou village, at least three and as many as 
thirty people were killed when police fired on a group of villagers who had 
lobbed fireworks and possibly homemade bombs at police.  The Dongzhou 
incident was the deadliest use of force by Chinese security personnel against 
Chinese citizens since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.4  
                                                 
1
  Edward Cody, One Riot Breaks Ground in China; This Time, Officials Respond to Farmers’ 
Protest With Pledge to Review Land Deal, WASH. POST, June 28, 2006, at A14. 
2
  Hannah Beech, Inside the Pitchfork Rebellion: Across China’s Heartland, Anger at Local 
Authorities is Growing Violent. Is This the Birth of a Revolution?, TIME, Mar. 13, 2006, at 28. 
3
  Id.; Howard W. French, Police in China Battle Villagers in Land Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2006, at A1. 
4
  The official death toll announced by the Chinese state-run media was three, but villagers’ reports 
and the Western media set it much higher. Howard W. French, Protesters Say Police in China Killed Up to 
20, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter 20 Killed]; Geoffrey York, Police Commander Arrested 
After Fatal Protest in China; Amnesty International Issues Call for Independent Probe into Village Attack, 
THE GLOBE AND  MAIL, Dec. 12, 2005, at A14. See also Howard W. French, Villages Tell of Lethal Attack 
by Chinese Forces on Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A3 [hereinafter Lethal Attack]. 
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 These incidents are part of a minor epidemic of unrest that has gripped 
rural China in recent years.  What unites them, besides their sensationalism, 
is the nature of the conflicts that inspired them.  In each incident, farmers 
were protesting decisions by local government officials over the use of 
village land. “[E]nvironmental, property rights, and land-use issues” have 
been the single largest source of civil unrest in China in recent years, and 
disputes involving rural land have, as the above episodes indicate, been 
especially incendiary. 5  This is not a phenomenon unique to wealthy 
Guangdong Province; protests also erupted over the use of rural land in 
Huaxi, Zhejing Province in 2006;6  Hanyuan, Sichuan Province in 2004;7  
Jinyuan, Zhejiang Province in 2003; 8 and numerous other locales.  
The farmers in Sanzhou were protesting the seizure of 750 acres of 
agricultural land by the village government.  That land had been sold to a 
developer who built the apartment building where the incident took place; 
the farmers claimed that the compensation paid for the land taken was 
inadequate.9  The protesters in Panlong resented both the seizure of village 
farmland for lease to a foreign investor and the level of compensation 
offered.10  The catalyst for the disturbance in Dongzhou was the construction 
of a coal-fired power plant.  Villagers were upset over the prospect of air 
pollution and plans to fill in a local body of water.  Also, like their 
counterparts in Sanzhou and Panlong, they were angered by the seizure of 
farmland for the project and asserted that the compensation offered was too 
low.11 
One Western journalist has wondered if the incidents might represent 
“the birth of a revolution.”12  This is surely hyperbole, but there remains 
                                                 
5
  20 Killed, supra note 4 (China’s Ministry of Public Security counted 87,000 incidents of social 
unrest in China in 2005.  This represented an increase of 6% from 2004 and 50%  from 2003).  Zhu Keliang 
& Roy Prosterman, From Land Rights to Economic Boom, CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, Jul.-Aug. 2006, 
available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0607/zhu.html; see also Pallavi Aiyar, China: 
More rights for millionaires, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IC22Ad01.html. Rural expropriation disputes caused more separate 
incidents of civil unrest than any other issue in China in 2006. Josephine Ma, Land Seizure Rows the Main 
Cause of Unrest in ’06, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 31, 2007. 
6
  Clifford Coonan, Unrest Grows in China Over Land Grabs, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 7, 2006, 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/unrest-grows-in-rural-china-over-land-grabs-
468893.html.  
7
 Andrew C. Murtha, The Ubiquity and Fungibility of Property Rights in China, 16-17 (2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
8
  Property Seizure in China: Roundtable Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 108th Cong. 35 
(2004) (prepared statement of Roy L. Prosterman, President, Rural Development Institute). 
9
  Cody, supra note 1. 
10
  Beech, supra note 2.  
11
  Lethal Attack, supra note 4. 
12
  Beech, supra note 2. 
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little doubt that how to manage rural land is one of the most pressing issues 
facing the Chinese government today.13  Opportunities for public debate on 
this issue have been especially plentiful over the past decade, in part because 
of the passage of a new comprehensive Property Law, which had been under 
debate since 2004, by the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) in March of 
2007.14  It has been suggested that the thorny question of how to deal with 
rural land was the most important reason why completion and passage of the 
law took so long.15 
 Media and scholarly attention has generally treated these conflicts as 
indications of pathologies in China’s laws governing takings of rural land 
and the compensation offered when such takings occur.  As will be 
discussed below, however, that understanding of the problem is incomplete.  
Below, I first analyze China’s legal regime governing rural land ownership, 
use, and takings; the conceptual implications and practical effects of that 
system; and the drawbacks of various proposals offered by both Chinese and 
Western scholars for improving that system.  To date, these proposals have 
tended to revolve conceptually around the ownership of rural land, drawing 
from theories and policy of eminent domain to approach the problem of 
what happens when government seizes rural land for a new use and often 
advocating measures that would strengthen the quasi-ownership rights of 
Chinese farmers to their land.  My interpretation of the pathologies in the 
current system, however, is that the underlying problem is one of land use 
rather than ownership.  My analysis supports a new focus that treats the 
Chinese rural land problem as every bit as much a regulatory takings 
problem as a problem of ordinary takings by eminent domain.  This new 
focus in turn supports my proposal for the introduction of tradable land 
development rights in rural land as the most promising solution to the social 
and political ills indicated by catastrophic events like those in Sanzhou, 
Panlong, and Dongzhou. 
 
                                                 
13
  See Fat of the Land, but only for a select few, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2006, for an excellent 
summary of the issues at stake. 
14
  Wuquan fa [Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective 
Oct. 1, 2007), 3 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 291 (2007), available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (P.R.C.) [hereinafter “Property 
Law”]. See generally Landmark Property Law Adopted, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/16/content_829330.htm; Caught Between Right and Left, 
Town and Country, ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2007, at 23, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/8815195; Jim Yardley, China Nears Passage of Landmark Property Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/09/business/09yuan.html.  
15
  Gregory M. Stein, Acquiring Land Use Rights in Today’s China: A Snapshot From the Ground, 24 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2006). 
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II. CHINESE LAW OF PROPERTY IN RURAL LAND: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Ownership of Rural Land 
 
Different ownership regimes for urban and rural land were established 
not long after the Communist government took power in 1949.  By the 
1960s, the State owned the vast majority of urban land.16  However, the 
story went quite differently for rural land.  Following the widespread 
redistribution of land from landlords to farmers in the early years of the 
Communist republic, the right of farmers to own agricultural land was 
acknowledged in Article 8 of the 1954 Chinese constitution.  However, that 
same constitutional provision also “encouraged” farmers to join and 
contribute their land to agricultural cooperatives and stated as a goal the 
gradual elimination of private ownership of rural land.  In reality, most 
Chinese peasants never experienced a set of rights approximating full 
ownership of the land they farmed.  After the Great Leap Forward of 1958, 
despite the continuation of the constitutional provision recognizing 
individual ownership of rural land, actual possession and control of that land 
was divided between communes, brigades, and production teams.  
Production teams retained the primary right to organize the cultivation and 
other use of rural land.17  Peasant households enjoyed virtually no rights to 
possess or use discrete parcels of land autonomously. 
This reality was finally acknowledged when the Chinese government 
rewrote the nation’s constitution in 1982.  Article 10 of the 1982 constitution 
provided that all rural and suburban land shall be “collectively owned.”18  
That provision continues in effect today; the current constitution, most 
recently revised in 2004, provides: 
 
All urban land is owned by the state. Land in rural and 
suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those 
portions which belong to the state in accordance with the law; 
                                                 
16
  See PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 10 (2000); Chengri 
Ding, Land Policy Reform in China: Assessment and Prospects, 20 LAND USE POL’Y 109, 112 (2003). But 
see Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking Property Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
227, 241 (2004) (“Some Chinese scholars argue that the land underneath privately owned homes also 
remained privately owned in law up until [the early 1980s].”). 
17
  Jamie Horsley, Land Ownership in China: A Brief Review of the Documentary Record, (May 12, 
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the China Law Center, Yale Law School). 
18
  Id. 
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house sites and private plots of cropland and hilly land are also 
owned by collectives.19 
 
In other words, under the Chinese constitution, land ownership is bifurcated; 
all land is owned either by the state or by the rural economic organizations 
known as “collectives.”  
The distinction between state and collective ownership is crucial to 
Article 10 of the constitution and, as will be discussed below, to many of the 
most severe problems currently plaguing the Chinese system of property in 
land.  Thus, it is somewhat ironic that the distinction is, for many practical 
purposes, not terribly clear or important.  The term “collective” is not 
defined in the constitution, and there is some uncertainty over what sort of 
entity should play that role.  It is quite common for the village “small group” 
(xiaozu, 小组) or the “natural village” (ziran cun,自然村), an organizational 
vestige of the production teams that controlled collective agriculture before 
the reforms of the 1980s, to act as collective owners.20  However, other 
entities, including town (zhen) governments and administrative villages 
(xingzheng cun, 行政村), also act as collective landowners in a number of 
rural areas.21  The village small group’s legal authority is tenuous; it is not a 
governmental entity or a legal person,22 and in practice its authority is often 
subordinated to that of village or town governments.23  
Several observers have noted that other governmental entities 
frequently assert control over the land use decisions of collective 
organizations; in other words, the same entities that are the official owners 
of state-owned (urban) land have the capacity to interfere with the decisions 
made by the official owners of collectively-owned (rural) land.24 
                                                 
19
  XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.). 
20
  According to one study, around 45% of collectively-owned land is owned by these entities. 
Yongshun Cai, Collective Ownership or Cadres’ Ownership?: The Non-agricultural Use of Farmland in 
China, 175 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 662, 665 (2003). Another puts the figure at 68%. YE JIANPING et al., 
eds., ZHONGGUO NONCUN TUDI CHANQUAN ZHIDU YANJIU [RESEARCH ON CHINA’S SYSTEM OF PROPERTY IN 
RURAL LAND] 68 (2000). 
21
 Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 24 (statement of Roy L. Prosterman). 
22 See Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, Annual Report, 2006, Part VII, available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt06/CivilSociety.php (discussing collectives’ nebulous 
legal status). 
23
 Wen Wei Po, Rural Land Reform Urgent: Shanghai Analyst, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD 
BROADCASTS, Jan. 3, 2001 (summarizing an interview with Yin Kunhua, director of the Real Estate 
Research Center at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics).  
24
  Yonshun Cai, supra note 20, at 665-66; Xiaolin Guo, The Role of Local Government in Creating 
Property Rights: A Comparison of Two Townships in Northwest Yunnan, in ANDREW G. WALDER & JEAN 
C. OI, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 71, 77-78 (1999); Stein, supra note 15, at 36-
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B. Use of Rural Land: Individual Land Use Rights 
 
Around the same time that the Chinese constitution clearly established 
that collectives, and not individuals, owned rural land, individual households 
were gradually regaining practical control over the use and proceeds of 
arable land.  The “household responsibility system,” instituted in rural areas 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, sought to improve agricultural 
productivity by de-communalizing the agricultural production process.  
Under this system, contracts between collectives and farming households 
grant households the right to farm individual parcels of land in exchange for 
the fulfillment of certain obligations, including payment of taxes and 
production quotas.25  Once those obligations are met, the farmers have the 
right to any residual income earned from farming the land.26  They also have 
the right to make all decisions regarding agricultural production on the 
land.27  The two major national statutes that currently govern use rights in 
rural land are the 1998 Land Administration Law (“LAL”) and the 2002 
Rural Land Contracting Law (“RLCL”).  Some provisions of these statutes 
are supported or expanded upon by the 2007 Property Law, and by the 
Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform 
and Development (“Decision on Major Issues”) issued by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2008.28 
Under the existing statutory framework, rural land use rights (“LURs”) 
in some ways resemble full economic ownership less than they do a social 
entitlement contingent on the holder’s place of residence and membership in 
a rural collective.  A collective is permitted to transfer LURs to individuals 
                                                                                                                                               
37. But see YE JIANPING, supra note 20, at 82-84 (arguing that collectives still play an independently 
meaningful role in rural land management). 
25
  Tudi guanli fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999) 4 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 341, at arts. 
9, 14 (1998) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter “LAL”]; Nongcun tudi chengbao fa [Rural Land Contracting Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003) 5 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 347 (2002) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter “RLCL”]. See also, e.g., 
Chris Bramall, Chinese Land Reform in Long-Run Perspective and in the Wider East Asian Context, 4 J. 
AGRARIAN CHANGE 107, 108 (2004); Xiaolin Guo, supra note 24, at 71; Samuel P.S. Ho & George C.S. 
Lin, Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices, 175 CHINA Q. 681, 689 
(2003); Kari Madrene Larson, A Lesson in Ingenuity: Chinese Farmers, the State, and the Reclamation of 
Farmland for Most Any Use, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 831, 836-37 (1998); Murtha, supra note 7, at 7. 
26
  See, e.g., RLCL, supra note 25 at art. 16; Yongshun Cai, supra note 20 at 665-66. 
27
  RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 16. But see Xiaolin Guo, supra note 24, at 75-77 (describing efforts 
by government officials in one rural locale to interfere with the crop mix decisions of farmers). 
28
  See Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tuijin nongcun gaige fazhan ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding 
[Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform and Development] (promulgated 
by the Central Comm. Chinese Communist Party, Oct. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=7542&keyword= (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Decision 
on Major Issues]. 
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who are not members of the collective; however, such a transaction may not 
take place without the approval of both two-thirds of the villagers’ 
representatives and the town government.29  Farming households who seek 
to transfer their LURs must give a certain degree of preference to potential 
transferees who are members of the same collective. 30   Perhaps most 
tellingly, collectives are required to cancel the LURs of farmers who move 
to and obtain residence permits in major cities.31  The personal status of the 
rights holder is crucial to the very nature of the rights, and a change in that 
status can lead to the cancellation of those rights.   
A recent change in the direction of enhancing farmers’ rights in land 
has been the explicit authorization and encouragement of voluntary, market-
based transfer of agricultural LURs among farming households.  Such 
transfers appear to have been rare until the late 1990s, at which point they 
increased drastically in frequency, at least in some areas of the country.32  
Calls for a clearer legal framework governing such transfers were then 
answered by the RLCL in 2002 and the Decision on Major Issues in 2008.33  
                                                 
29
  LAL, supra note 25, at art. 15. 
30
  RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 33. 
31
  RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 26. A farming household needs to move to a city that is large enough 
to be divided into multiple administrative districts (shequdeshi, 设区的市) in order to lose its LURs. 
Households that move to smaller cities (xiaochengzhen, 小城镇) must be allowed to retain their rural LURs. 
Id. Interestingly, rural LUR holders who switch from agricultural to non-agricultural living are allowed to 
retain their LURs; it is geographical identity, and not occupation, that determines their rights. RLCL, supra 
note 25 art. 41. 
 This rule may change in the foreseeable future. Previous drafts of the Property Law reiterated the 
requirement in the RLCL that LURs be cancelled for rural families that move to large cities.  Wuquan fa: 
cao’an [Draft Property Law] (released for comment by the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 2005) 5 STANDING 
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 348  at art. 135 (2005, available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=339451&pdmc=zxbd (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter 2005 Draft Property Law]. The final version of the Property Law, however, omits any mention 
of this requirement.  See Property Law, supra note 14.  While this does not mean that the relevant provision 
in the RLCL has been invalidated, it does provide more leeway for the NPC to remove it pursuant to future 
amendments to the RLCL than if such a requirement had also been enshrined in the Property Law.  For 
now, the Property Law refers to the RLCL for law on rural LUR transfers.  See Property Law, supra note 
14, at art. 129. 
32
  Qian Forrest Zhang et al., Development of Land Rental Markets in Rural Zhejiang: Growth of Off-
farm Jobs and Institution Building 180 CHINA Q. 1031, 1034 (2004); Qian Forrest Zhang, Do Rural Land 
Markets Increase Inequality? Evidence from a Chinese Province 1 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the author). 
33
  RLCL, supra note 25, at arts. 10, 32, 33, 36, 37; China Extends Rural Reform and Development in 
New Party Document, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 20, 2008, at 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6517482.html.   See also Property Law, supra note 14, at 
art. 129; Nongcun tudi chengbaojingyingquan liuzhuan guanli banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Circulation of Rural Land Contracted Management Right] (promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Jan. 
19, 2005, effective Mar. 1, 2005),  available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=3933&keyword=rural land (P.R.C.). See 
generally CHE YUBIN, ZHONGGUO NONGDI LIUZHUAN JIZHI YANJIU (RESEARCH ON THE MECHANISM OF 
CHINESE RURAL LAND TRANSFER) (2004); see also YE JIANPING, supra note 20, at 77-82 (describing novel 
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These documents provide that rural LURs may be circulated through a 
number of transfer forms, including subcontract, lease, and exchange,34 for 
terms not to exceed the remaining life of the underlying contract.35   
An increase in such transactions would appear to represent a basic 
expansion of farmers’ economic rights in land.  Rural land users may now 
earn income not only from farming land themselves, but also from rent or 
other fees earned by subcontracting, subleasing, or otherwise transferring the 
land to other parties.  This arguably represents the conversion of rural LURs 
from “dead capital” to a true form of wealth, fungible and secure, for the 
farmers who own them.36 
However, two important restrictions continue to straighten the rights 
of farming households to monetize use rights in land.  The first of these 
restrictions comes from the fact that the law does not permit holders of rural 
LURs to mortgage the underlying property.37  The continuing prohibition 
against mortgaging rural LURs not only enhances the legal distinction 
between property in urban and in rural land, but it also helps support a 
difference in value between them.38  A second, and more crucial, restriction 
circumscribing the scope of farmers’ rights in land is not actually a 
restriction on the LURs owned by farming households; it is, instead, a use 
restriction applicable to the underlying land, by virtue of its status as 
collectively-owned land.  A major condition governing collective ownership 
is the principle that the default, and in many cases the only permitted, use of 
collectively-owned land is for agricultural purposes.39  
Agricultural land may not be converted to other uses without the 
approval of the relevant county government.40  National law also restricts the 
situations in which such approval may be granted.  Article 43 of LAL 
provides that entities or individuals who wish to use or build anything on 
                                                                                                                                               
initiatives undertaken by local governments to encourage the use of market or other efficiency-oriented 
mechanisms to effect the transfer of land between agricultural users). 
34
  RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 32. 
35
  RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 33; Decision on Major Issues, supra note 28. 
36
 Zhu Keliang & Prosterman, supra note 5, at 47. 
37
  See, e.g., Roy Prosterman et al., Implementation of 30-Year Land Use Rights for Farmers Under 
China’s 1998 Land Management Law: An Analysis and Recommendations Based on a 17 Province Survey 
22 (Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development No. 105, 2000). 
38
  See Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 29 (testimony of Roy L. Prosterman) (predicting 
that allowing the mortgage of rural LURs could be “the beginning of a modern rural banking system”); Ho 
& Lin, supra note 25, at 700-703 (describing a dramatic increase in the use of urban LURs as collateral 
between 1993 and 1998). 
39
  Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang tudi tiaokong youguan wenti de tongzhi [Circular on Intensifying 
Land Control] (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 31, 2006) 30 STATE COUNCIL GAZ. 8 pt. 6 (2006) 
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2006 Land Control Circular]; RLCL, supra note 25, at arts. 8, 17; RANDOLPH & 
JIANBO, supra note 16, at 81-82; Ho & Lin, supra note 25, at 689. 
40
 LAL, supra note 25, at art. 44. 
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land must apply to the state to receive LURs—to state-owned land only—for 
this purpose.  The article also makes an exception to this presumption for 
several categories of builders:  rural collectives that seek to construct 
facilities for “township-village enterprises” (“TVEs”), which are rural 
enterprises owned and managed by local governments;41 farming households 
that seek to build housing they will occupy themselves;42 and township or 
village governments that seek to build public facilities.  However, non-
agricultural construction on collectively-owned rural land may not take place 
for any other purpose.43  Peasant households that hold agricultural LURs 
may not engage in such construction,44 and, as a general rule, holders of 
agricultural LURs to collectively-owned land may not transfer those LURs 
to other parties for such construction.45  Some observers46 have pointed out 
that the ultimate origins of this proscription lie in Article 10 of the 
Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll urban land is owned by the state.”47  
If one accepts that all land not used for agriculture, rural government 
facilities, peasant housing, and TVEs is “urban,” then, indeed, allowing 
other uses on non-state-owned land is unconstitutional. 
In summation, private property rights in rural land are not rights of 
ownership, which are instead held by the quasi-governmental collective 
organization.  Instead, these private rights are use rights, created by contracts 
between the user and the collective owner, and dependent in part on the 
status of the private user as a member of the landowning collective.  The 
rural rights-holder and the collective owner may not convert the land to non-
agricultural uses except in a few specified circumstances.  The effects of this 
restriction on daily life, livelihoods, and land use in rural China have been 
overwhelming. 
 
C. Requisition and Use Conversion 
 
A rather interesting feature of China’s laws limiting the conversion of 
land from agricultural to other uses is that they do not constitute an in rem 
                                                 
41
 For more details on TVEs, see, e.g., Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF 
PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 297, 310-14 (Dani Rodrik, ed., 2003). 
42
 Peasant households are not permitted to use more than one parcel for residential construction.  LAL, 
supra note 25, at art. 62. 
43
 LAL, supra note 25, at art. 43.  
44
 RLCL, supra note 25, at arts. 17, 60. 
45
 LAL, supra note 25, at arts. 63, 81. 
46
 E.g., Zhou Qiren, Professor, Peking University, Nongdi chanquan yu zhengdi zhidu [System of 
Property Rights and Expropriation of Rural Land], Speech at Yale University (Sept. 12, 2003) (transcript 
available in the China Law Center, Yale University). 
47
 XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.). 
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restriction, as it were, that attaches to the land itself.  Instead, they are more 
in the nature of an in personam restriction:  their application depends not on 
the location or other characteristics of the land, but on how and by whom the 
land is owned.  Article 43 of LAL, for example, does not draw a distinction 
based on whether or not land is arable.  Instead, it stipulates that all new 
construction shall happen on state-owned land, unless the construction is of 
TVE facilities, farmers’ housing, or public facilities.48  In other words, it is 
the fact that land is owned by collectives rather than the state, and not that it 
is currently arable, that makes it unavailable for construction except for 
those listed uses.  
However, Article 44 requires government approval at the county or 
higher level for “changes in the use” of “agricultural land,” without 
specifying whether or not that land is owned by the state or by a collective.49  
Indeed, Article 10 of the Constitution does provide that rural or suburban 
land may be owned by the state in exceptional circumstances “in accordance 
with the law.”50  Thus, it would seem that a party who wanted to develop 
agricultural land for purposes other than TVE facilities, peasant housing, or 
public facilities could do so, as long as that land could be moved somehow 
from the collective ownership system to the state ownership system.  
Approval by the county government would still be required, but the 
development would certainly be possible.  In fact, this is precisely what is 
happening, on a massive scale, in rural China today.  Article 45 of LAL 
describes the mechanism by which this may take place:  “expropriation” 
(zhengshou, 征收) of collectively-owned land by instrumentalities of the 
state.51  This so-called “expropriation” is rural China’s version of a taking by 
eminent domain.  However, instead of the government taking ownership 
rights from private parties, “expropriation” is the government taking 
ownership rights from another quasi-governmental organization—the 
collective—and use rights from private parties. 
Article 10 of the constitution provides that:  “The state may, in the 
public interest, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make 
compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned in accordance with 
the law.”52  Like the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the 
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 LAL, supra note 25, at art. 43.  
49
 LAL, supra note 25, at art. 44. 
50
 XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.). 
51
 LAL, supra note 25, at art. 45.  
52
 XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.).  As this language demonstrates, Chinese law uses both of the 
terms “expropriation” (zhengshou, 征收) and “requisition” (zhengyong, 征用).  Unfortunately, sources are 
not in agreement as to how to distinguish the two terms.  One source claims that “expropriation” refers to 
the permanent compulsory transfer of land ownership from a collective to the state, while “requisition” 
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wording of which it evokes, this provision places two major restrictions on 
its grant of power to the government to expropriate land.  
 
1. Public Interest Requirement 
 
The first restriction is that the act of expropriation or requisition may 
take place only “in the public interest.”53  However, the phrase “in the public 
interest” is not defined in the major documents governing land requisition or 
elsewhere in the Constitution.  Though this requirement is reiterated in LAL 
(“[t]he state may expropriate or requisition land in the public interest in 
accordance with the law . . . .”)54 and in the Property Law,55 those statutes 
also do not provide any guidance on how to determine whether or not an 
expropriation is in fact in the public interest.  
It is clear from recent practice, though, that the phrase “in the public 
interest” means something broader than “for public use.” 56   Local 
governments quite routinely expropriate collectively-owned land and then 
promptly transfer use rights in that land to private developers or joint 
private-public for-profit ventures.  For example, the disturbances in Sanzhou 
and Panlong, described above in Part I, both erupted over expropriations that 
resulted in the use of the expropriated land by a private apartment developer, 
                                                                                                                                               
refers to the temporary use of land by the state with the residual interest remaining in the hands of the 
collective.  Asian Development Bank, Capacity Building for Resettlement Risk Management: The Scope of 
Land Expropriation Rights 1 (PRC Thematic Report No. 1, March 2006), available at 
http://www.asiandevbank.org/Resettlement/activities/TA6091REG/PRC-Thematic-Report-1.pdf.  Another 
source asserts that one refers to the taking of land for use by the government entity that takes it, while the 
other refers to the government entity’s acquisition of land to be used by a private entity or another 
government entity.  RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 16, at 61 n.6.  Many legal documents conflate the two, 
under the more general term “taking of land” (zhengdi, 征地).  Guotu ziyuan bu guanyu jiakuai tuijin 
zhengdi buchang anzhi zhengyi xietiao caijue zhidu de tongzhi [Circular on Accelerating the Establishment 
of the System for the Settlement of Land Requisition Disputes by Mediation and Ruling] (promulgated by 
the Ministry of Land and Resources, June 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=5324&keyword=land requisition disputes 
(P.R.C.); Guotu ziyuan bu guanyu wanshan zhengdi buchang anzhi zhidu de zhidao yijian de tongzhi 
[Circular of Guiding Opinion on Perfecting the System of Compensation and Resettlement for Takings of 
Land] (promulgated by the Ministry of Land and Resources, Jan. 3, 2004) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2004 MLR 
Circular]. Relevant provisions of the LAL seem to use these terms interchangeably.  LAL, supra note 25, 
art. 45 (using first “requisition” and then “expropriation”).  Because it does not appear that the legal 
distinction is clear, if it exists at all, this essay will simply use the term “expropriation” to refer to all 
takings of collectively-owned land. 
53
 The language in Article 10 that is translated as “public interest” (“gonggong liyi,” 公共利益) is, 
just as it sounds in English, arguably broader than the phrase “public use” found in the U.S. Constitution.  
U.S. CONST. amend. V. cl. 4. 
54
 LAL, supra note 25, at art. 2. 
55
 Property Law, supra note 14, at art. 41. 
56
 See Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 19 (testimony of Jacques DeLisle, Professor, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School). 
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in the former case, and a foreign investor, in the latter.57  It is more or less 
taken for granted in China today that takings of rural land frequently occur 
for the ultimate purpose of for-profit development, in which the government 
entity handling the taking may or may not hold an equity stake.58  
An effective distinction between public and private use may be much 
more difficult to draw in the Chinese context than in other contexts.  Chinese 
local governments tend to obtain revenues for their operations in part 
through acting as business entities in their own right.  TVEs, discussed 
above, are a clear example of this tendency.  Increasingly, local governments 
that expropriate land will act developers of that land themselves before 
transferring use rights to a private entity at a profit.59  
 
2.  Compensation Requirement 
 
The second constitutional limitation on state takings of land—that 
“just compensation” be paid “in accordance with the law”—is, in contrast, 
amply fleshed out in related statutes.  The basic requirements come from 
LAL.  Article 47 requires that three kinds of payments be made when rural 
land is expropriated:  basic “compensation” payments for the land itself 
(buchang fei, 补偿费 ), “resettlement assistance” payments for those 
individuals occupying the land (anzhi buzhu fei, 安置补助费 ), and 
compensation payments for personal property attached to the land and for 
standing crops (dishang fuzhuowu he qingmiao de buchang fei, 地上附着物
和青苗的补偿费).  
Precise standards for the amount of each form of compensation are to 
be determined by provincial and municipal governments.  However, LAL 
provides basic guidelines for the first two forms.  Basic compensation 
payments should be between six and ten times the average value of the 
agricultural output of the expropriated land for the three years prior to 
expropriation.  Resettlement assistance payments are to be determined by 
first dividing the quantity of land taken by the figure for per-capita land 
                                                 
57
 See supra notes 1 and 2. 
58
 See, e.g., Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 44 (prepared statement of Brian 
Schwarzwalder et al.) (describing limited survey evidence indicating that around half of rural land takings 
are for private commercial purposes); Che Yubin, supra note 33, at 82-83 (asserting that, though takings of 
rural land for use by public entities are more frequent than those for use by private entities, the latter remain 
common and tend to be of much larger parcels of land); Lin Yan, Nongdi zhengyong dijia buchang de zhidu 
genyuan yu xiaolu sunshi [The Origins of and Harm to Efficiency Caused by the System of Low 
Compensation for Requisition of Agricultural Land], 2 NONGCUN JINGJI 27, 28 (2004) (P.R.C.) (noting that, 
in 1992, 74% of the 200 largest takings of land were for use by private, for-profit entities). 
59
 Liu Zuoxiang, Chengshihua, nongdi zhengyong yu shidi nongmin liyi buchang [Urbanization, 
Farmland Requisition and Compensation to the Farmers], 13:1 CHENGSHI FAZHAN YANJIU 88, 90 (2006). 
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allocation in that particular collective; this yields the number of individuals 
who require relocation assistance.  For example, if twenty hectares are taken 
from a collective that has 120 peasant members and owns forty hectares of 
land, then it will be assumed that sixty individuals require assistance, even if 
the actual number is larger or smaller.  Payment for each individual assumed 
to require assistance should be four to six times the three-year average 
annual output of the land taken.  The sum of basic compensation and 
resettlement assistance payments is capped at thirty times annual average 
output.60 
It is telling that the value of the land that is taken is determined with 
reference to its value for its pre-expropriation (agricultural) use.  This 
formula implies that rural collectives and peasant households, who are 
generally not permitted to use rural land for any but agricultural purposes, do 
not have a right to the economic value of potential non-agricultural uses of 
that land.  
 
III. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF TAKINGS IN RURAL CHINA 
 
Part II’s introduction to China’s system of property in rural land is 
intended to provide essential background for understanding the unrest 
described in Part I.  Specifically, it ought to demonstrate that the problem 
giving rise to the unrest is more complex than the bare phrase 
“dissatisfaction with the exercise of eminent domain” would suggest, 
particularly to the reader most familiar with the implications of that phrase 
in the American context.  
Government takings of property are never unproblematic.  In some 
ways, the intense dissatisfaction observed in China seems less explicable 
than protests against the exercise of eminent domain in the United States.  
Expropriation of rural land in China involves not the transfer of ownership 
rights from a private party to a government entity but, instead, the transfer of 
ownership rights from one form of government entity to another.  The 
individuals whose dissatisfaction caused the incidents discussed in Part I had 
lost not fee simple ownership rights but, instead, rights to use land for a 
limited time and a limited purpose.  These rights are connected to some 
extent with these individuals’ status as residents of particular villages and 
members of certain collectives and have until quite recently been subject to 
alteration and amendment on a somewhat regular basis.  Most of these 
individuals have no experience purchasing or selling these rights on an open 
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 Id. 
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market and thus probably have a difficult time valuing them so as to derive a 
figure against which to evaluate the compensation offered by the 
government. 
At the same time, there are a number of reasons why the grievances of 
Chinese farmers affected by land takings far overwhelm those of an 
American citizen who loses a home or business to eminent domain.  The 
immediately following discussion analyzes in depth the particular 
characteristics and effects of Chinese takings that make them the incendiary 
phenomenon that they are. 
 
A.  The Expropriation Surplus 
 
Immediately above, I named a number of factors that distinguish the 
expropriation of rural land in China from otherwise similar phenomena 
elsewhere.  More important than all of these factors, however, is the fact that 
rural takings in China are not merely a means of affecting a transfer of 
ownership.  They are also the only means of affecting a change in use.  
As discussed in Part II.B., collectively-owned land cannot be used for 
purposes other than agriculture, peasant housing, public facilities, or TVE 
facilities, without first being converted to state-owned land.  Once land is 
converted, the array of uses to which it may be put becomes much greater.  
In addition, LURs in state-owned land are more completely “commoditized” 
than rural LURs under current law:61  the former may be transferred with 
less consideration of the identity of the transferee and may be mortgaged.  
Thus, it is only reasonable to expect that the value of LURs in two otherwise 
identical parcels of land will be significantly higher in a parcel that is state-
owned than in one that is collectively-owned.  I will refer to this difference 
in value as the “expropriation surplus.”  In essence, the expropriation surplus 
is the product of two separate phenomena:  first, the substantial difference 
between the price of land designated for agricultural uses and the price of 
land on which private commercial construction is permitted (this difference 
will be referred to in this article as the “urbanization surplus”); second, a 
land use regime that requires expropriation for conversion from the former 
to the latter use. 
Numerous observers have identified the expropriation surplus, though 
not by this precise name, as a major source of tension in the Chinese rural 
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 Donald C. Clarke, Incentives and the Bottom-Up Approach to Land Use Regulation in China, Jan. 
31, 2000, at 2-3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
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takings system.62  The expropriation surplus in rural China results from the 
fact that the very process of expropriation of rural land by the state augments 
the land with additional development rights (the right to develop the land for 
non-agricultural commercial purposes),63 and additional transfer rights (the 
right to mortgage the land). 
Evidence supports the theory just described; the value of LURs in new 
state-owned land is much higher than the “value,” as evidenced by the 
statutory compensation system, of that same land when it is collectively 
owned.  Total compensation payments are generally only a fraction of the 
amount of money that the expropriating government receives when it sells 
LURs in the expropriated land to new private users.64  In one incident, LURs 
to expropriated land in Yunnan Province were sold for 150,000 yuan per mu 
(approximately one-sixth of an acre), but compensation to the collective was 
only 28,000 yuan per mu, which would indicate that the expropriation 
surplus was equal to roughly four hundred thirty-five percent of the 
compensation payment. 65   A study in one county in wealthier Zhejiang 
Province found that, in one suburban district, agricultural land that was 
expropriated for a compensation fee of around fifty thousand yuan per mu 
yielded urban LUR fees of around one 1,500,000 yuan per mu.66  A more 
ambitious study estimates that only one-twentieth of the price of urban LUR 
fees paid for all formerly agricultural land converted since 1979 was paid as 
compensation to farmers.67  
Of course, one can argue that the expropriation surplus is not entirely 
the result of underlying differences in value between urban and rural land.  
Instead, it could merely be the result of the fact that the compensation 
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 Chengri Ding, supra note 16, at 116; Clarke, supra note 61, at 2-3; Qiren Zhou, supra note 46, at 5-
6. 
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 Several commentators have focused on the concept of development rights in their analysis of this 
problem. Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu, Nongcun jiti tudi fazhanquan de eryuan zhuti ji qi maodun [The 
Dual Owners of Rural Collective Land Development Rights and the Contradiction Between Them], 5 
NANJING CAIJING DAXUE XUEBAO 24 (2004) (P.R.C.); Liu Zuoxiang, supra note 59, at 91-92. Their 
arguments are discussed in more detail infra.  
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 The fees generated by the sale of LURs in urban land are split between the relevant local 
government and the central government; 70% of the proceeds go to the former, and 30% to the latter. LAL, 
supra note 25, at art. 55; Yue Zhenghua, Wo guo nongdi zhengyong buchang zhidu de fumian xiaoying 
fenxi [An Analysis of the Negative Effects of the Chinese System of Compensation for Expropriation of 
Agricultural Land], 2005:9 NONGCUN JINGJI 30, 32;.  One little-discussed and potentially positive effect of 
widespread expropriation is the extensive contribution it makes to certain local government coffers. 
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 Id. at 51. In this particular case, only 9,000-10,000 yuan per mu of the total compensation was 
actually distributed to farmers who had lost their LURs. 
66
 Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 28. Of the 50,000 yuan paid in compensation to the collective, only 
20,000-30,000 yuan was distributed to farmers. 
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 Hou Huali & Du Juan, Tudi fazhanquan yu nongmin quanyi de weihu [Land Development Rights 
and the Protection of Farmers’ Interests], 11 NONGCUN JINGJI 78, 79 (2005) (P.R.C.). 
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figures are hardly trustworthy proxies for the actual value of collectively-
owned land; after all, they are set unilaterally by the party seeking to acquire 
that land.  The unilateral nature of “transactions” by eminent domain means 
that they are a very poor indicator of the market value of property that 
changes hands through them.  It is undeniable that a government entity that 
both expropriates land and sets the compensation has a strong motivation to 
keep the compensation low.  
However, I will argue that this factor is not the sole source of the 
expropriation surplus.  First, the method for determining compensation for 
rural land in China is arguably less open to manipulation than the methods 
used in other regimes—it is based on one factor (recent average annual 
agricultural income) that is relatively verifiable.  Second, articles and 
research describing the unrest arising from rural takings virtually always 
compare the compensation distributed to farmers to the sums paid to the 
expropriating government by the new user, not to the average annual 
agricultural income on which compensation is supposed to be based.68  If 
local officials were in fact manipulating the statutory formula in order to 
depress compensation, one would expect that protesting farmers, who know 
how much agricultural income they have earned from their land in recent 
years, would point to the difference between the figures yielded by the 
statutory formula and the actual compensation paid.  All in all, 
circumstantial evidence indicates that the expropriation surplus is not 
entirely created by arbitrary actions of local officials seeking to depress 
compensation in violation of the statutory formula.  
One could still argue, though, that the statutory compensation formula 
underestimates even the true value of LURs in land that is limited to 
agricultural use, and that this underestimation contributes more to the 
expropriation surplus than any inherent difference in the value of land used 
for agriculture and land usable for other purposes.  However, very rough 
calculations show that, though the statutory formula probably is set too low, 
this fact by itself does not explain the full extent of the expropriation surplus.  
One can assume, for example, that the truly fair value of thirty-year use 
rights in agricultural land is the discounted value of the income foreseeable 
from that land over thirty years.  For convenience’s sake, that figure can 
simply be set at thirty times the average annual agricultural output of the 
                                                 
68
 E.g., Beech, supra note 2 (“[C]ompensation per mu . . . would amount to about $100 a year, even 
though the factor was paying $3,300 per mu [for rights to the expropriated land]”.); Cody, supra note 1 
(“[T]he complaint voiced most often by farmers [is that] local officials pocket the difference between low 
compensation paid to farmers and the high market price charged to developers.”); sources cited supra notes 
64 and 65. 
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past three years; this assumes, generously, that the annual rate of growth of 
the output value will suffice to cancel out whatever the appropriate discount 
rate is, and that the thirty-year term of the present LUR holder has just begun.  
In keeping with the statements of a prominent Western commentator on the 
subject, one can also assume that the value of thirty-year LURs constitutes 
around eighty-five percent of the value of fee simple ownership of collective 
land limited to agricultural use.69  Thus, it would seem that the full fair value 
of a parcel of land that is restricted to agricultural use is roughly thirty-five 
times the average annual income it generates.70 
The statutory compensation formula provides for six to ten times the 
average annual agricultural income to be paid as basic compensation, and for 
a maximum of fifteen times the average annual income to be paid for 
resettlement assistance.  The sum of these two payments is capped at thirty 
times annual output.  From this latter fact, it is clear that compensation 
payments will always fall short, sometimes far short, of the fair value of the 
agricultural land as estimated above.  It is fair to assume, for example, that 
total payments are frequently as low as twenty (eight for basic compensation 
payment, twelve for resettlement assistance) times the average annual 
output—less than sixty percent of the estimated fair value.  Even so, this 
discrepancy—between statutory compensation and compensation that more 
closely approximates fair market value—pales in comparison to the 
discrepancy frequently observed between compensation paid and the resale 
value of LURs in the land once it is urbanized.  In the examples given above, 
which are by no means atypical, the latter discrepancy was a factor of four, 
in one case, and a factor of close to thirty, in the other.  Even if the statutory 
compensation formula yields a figure that is less than sixty percent the fair 
market value of the land when it is used for agriculture, it is still clear that 
the land is worth significantly more to those who would and can use it for 
non-agricultural purposes than to those who can expect nothing more from it 
than the value of its agricultural output. 
This analysis is, as mentioned above, based on very rough estimates 
and a good deal of guesswork.  Nonetheless, it demonstrates that the 
expropriation surplus is created by several factors:  the motivation and 
ability of local officials to keep compensation on the low end of the statutory 
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 Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 22 (testimony of Roy L. Prosterman). 
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 Obviously, the comparisons done here would be much more meaningful if the fair value of a parcel 
of agricultural land were determined using the actual amount paid for rural LURs that are circulated 
through market transactions, as described supra, Part II.B.  Unfortunately, to the best of this author’s 
knowledge, no data is available comparing the value of rural LURs exchanged through market transactions 
with either the amount of compensation later paid for those same LURs or the selling price of urban LURs 
in the same land post-expropriation. 
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formula; the difference between the values yielded by the statutory 
compensation formula and likely estimates of the value of rural land based 
on its agricultural yield; and the difference between the value of rural land 
devoted to agricultural use, and the value of the same land devoted to 
another commercial use.  The first two factors are a function of the fact that 
expropriation is an involuntary transfer of property rights to the government, 
and of the legal system surrounding such transfers.  The third factor, which 
is at least as substantial, is not the direct result of the fact that expropriation 
involves an involuntary transfer of property rights.  It is, instead, a result of a 
change in the land use regime applicable to the land in question.  
 
B.  Effects of the Current Expropriation System 
 
The anecdotes in Part I constitute circumstantial evidence that 
something is wrong with the Chinese legal regime surrounding the 
expropriation of rural land.  This Section will expand on that hypothesis by 
attempting to describe the mechanisms through which the system goes 
wrong.  Scholars and other observers have tended to emphasize five major 
destructive effects of the regime; this Part will review each of these in turn 
and evaluate the relative role each may play in rendering the regime 
dysfunctional.  Throughout this discussion, the concept of the expropriation 
surplus will provide a useful analytical framework. 
 
1.  Waste or Inefficient Use of Land 
 
 Canonical analyses of American takings jurisprudence have identified 
the pursuit of “efficiency” as one primary goal of compensation for 
government expropriation of private property.71  Some efficiency analyses of 
compensation systems focus on those systems’ influences on the behavior of 
private actors,72 but the majority focus on their influence on the behavior of 
governmental actors.  One kind of inefficiency that results from a non-
optimal compensation system is described thusly:  “[i]f the government were 
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 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 64 (Aspen 5th ed. 1998); Michael A. Heller & 
James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998; Thomas J. 
Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 749, 750 (1994); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
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 For example, it has been suggested that the failure to compensate for physical takings distorts the 
market behavior of individuals who are risk-averse and have no way to insure against the risk of losing 
their property, without compensation, to the government. Lawrence Blume & Daniel J. Rubinfeld, 
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 584-89 (1984). 
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free to take resources without paying [or without paying enough] for them, it 
would not feel incentives, created by the price system, to use those resources 
efficiently.”73  
Indeed, at first glance the American efficiency analysis seems readily 
applicable to the takings problem in rural China.  Critics of the Chinese 
expropriation system do frequently assert that it enables the devotion of 
expropriated land to uses other than its highest and best use.74  By arranging 
for the expropriation and use conversion of agricultural land, local 
governments essentially get money for nothing.  The difference between the 
total price paid by a private developer for LURs in newly-urbanized land 
and the portion of that price that is designated as compensation represents 
almost pure profit for an expropriating government; only the (presumably 
low) administrative costs of arranging the transaction prevent the amount of 
profit from equaling the full expropriation surplus.  Local governments 
therefore can afford to be less demanding about the prices they charge for 
LURs in newly-urbanized land.  This in turn means that developers may 
obtain these LURs at bargain prices that allow inefficient uses of the land.  
A contrasting but related possibility created by the expropriation 
surplus is that local governments might expropriate land without an eventual 
transferee in mind.  If compensation is low enough and the potential 
expropriation surplus is high enough, a government may determine that it is 
well worth its while to expropriate land even in the face of the risk that no 
buyer of LURs to that land will appear.  For example, if there is only a 
twenty-five percent chance that a buyer will be found who is willing to pay 
five times the amount of compensation—by no means an unrealistic figure 
in these sorts of transactions—then a local government’s expected return on 
its “investment” (the amount of compensation) is still one hundred percent. 
The most pernicious variation on this phenomenon would be the total 
non-use of expropriated land.  Private transferees may find it expedient to 
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 Heller & Krier, supra note 71, at 999.  American efficiency analysis of takings law has been 
criticized for sometimes facilely and inaccurately equating local governments with market actors and 
ignoring the fact that the incentives of those governments are more closely related to voter support and 
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and tend to prioritize fiscal concerns.  E.g., Stein, supra note 15, at 59 (identifying the conflict between the 
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leave land purchased at bargain prices temporarily idle; this state of affairs is 
said to have been quite common in the early 1990s, in the wake of extensive 
conversion of agricultural land.75  Local governments may be unable to find 
purchasers for expropriated land.  This phenomenon is widespread enough 
that a phrase (zhengerbuyong, 征而不用 ) that plays on a word for 
expropriation (zhengyong, 征用) has been coined to describe it.76 
There is a very convincing logic to the argument just made.  
Unfortunately, that argument is based largely on hypotheticals; there is only 
limited empirical evidence demonstrating that the expropriation system leads 
to projects that utilize land inefficiently.  The coining of a phrase to describe 
the phenomenon of expropriated land lying unused seems reasonably 
reliable evidence that this does occur with some frequency, but quantitative 
proof of that phenomenon’s prevalence is hard to obtain.  In fact, there is an 
argument that the very existence of the expropriation surplus indicates that 
most expropriations cannot be that inefficient.  If land is worth significantly 
more under an urban use regime, then there must be a net social benefit 
stemming from its transfer, even if that transfer does not result in the 
optimally efficient use.  Moreover, the observation above that Chinese local 
governments behave more like market actors than do American local 
governments would seem to reduce the likelihood that Chinese local 
governments will dedicate land to less efficient uses.  Since Chinese local 
governments are, on the whole, more likely to be single-mindedly concerned 
with revenues than an American governmental actor (who may be interested 
in political donations or voter support), they are likely to grant LURs in 
newly expropriated land to the highest bidder, who in turn should 
presumably be the most profitable user. 
These concerns all point to the conclusion that the actual event of 
expropriation is less of a source of inefficiency than the underlying land use 
regime that makes it profitable—that is, the regulatory division between 
agricultural and non-agricultural use.  In fact, there is evidence that the 
current demand for state-owned, developable land far exceeds supply, and 
that the opposite is true for collective, rural land available for transfer for 
agricultural uses.77 
In other words, the efficiency analysis of takings compensation, when 
applied to the system of expropriation of Chinese rural land, leads only to 
ambiguous conclusions.  There is a powerful theoretical argument that the 
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incentives of local governments are skewed by the expropriation surplus in 
the direction of excessive, inefficient expropriation.  However, there is also 
an argument that, if anything, too little expropriation takes place, despite the 
incentives created by the expropriation surplus—that expropriation is, in 
essence, an efficient response to inefficient regulatory restrictions on the use 
of collective land.  In the absence of extensive empirical evidence, it is all 
but impossible to choose between these two arguments.  This failure of a 
classical “efficiency” analysis to yield a clear evaluation of China’s 
expropriation system only highlights the importance of the effects of that 
system that are discussed immediately below. 
 
2.  Demoralization Costs and Civil Unrest 
 
The “efficiency” analysis of takings compensation, described above, 
is concerned only with whether governments are forced to pay sufficiently 
for land, not with whether the individuals from whom land is taken are 
sufficiently compensated.  Michael Heller and James Krier distinguish 
between the “distribution” and “deterrence” functions of compensation for 
takings:  while the “deterrence” function merely requires that the 
government pay for what it takes, so that it will have incentives to make 
efficient use of it, the “distribution” function is dependent on payment 
actually being made to parties who lose property. 78   The expropriation 
surplus is the difference between the money paid and the money received by 
local governments in the process of land expropriation; it has nothing to do 
with the portion of the money paid to evicted farmers.  In fact, the 
expropriation surplus could be eliminated without increasing payments to 
evicted farmers at all. 
This most definitely does not mean that the amounts actually paid to 
dispossessed farmers are unimportant, though.  Perhaps the single most 
obvious effect of the current compensation system, and the effect which 
needs the least proof or explanation, is the serious damage to social stability 
that the system has done in recent years.  All of the instances of civil unrest 
described in Part I are illustrative.  In those instances, and a good many 
others like them, the main complaint of the aggrieved farmers who 
participated in the unrest was not the fact that their land had been taken at all, 
but was instead that the compensation offered them was too low.79  
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The frequency with which rural land expropriation leads to violent 
expressions of dissatisfaction by villagers indicates that the compensation 
system has failed to achieve another major goal for such systems:  “justice” 
or “fairness.”80  While efficiency concerns respond mainly to the variable of 
how much is paid for expropriated property, the justice of a taking depends 
just as much on the party to whom those amounts are paid.  
However, the line between the justice failings of China’s 
compensation system and its efficiency effects is not particularly clear or 
impermeable. Simply put, the justice failings can aggravate any potential 
efficiency failings.  A groundbreaking article by Frank Michelman, which 
inspires Heller and Krier’s justice and efficiency analysis, proposes that 
justice—or “fairness,” in Michelman’s terminology—failings in a takings 
regime are a source of concern in part because they produce “demoralization 
costs.” Michelman defines demoralization costs: 
 
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which 
accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the 
realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present 
capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either 
impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of 
uncompensated losers . . . 81 
 
In other words, the failure to compensate parties sufficiently leads to 
inefficiencies unrelated to the specific takings transaction for which 
compensation might be due.  These inefficiencies are likely to have nothing 
to do with the level of efficiency with which the property at issue will be 
used; instead, they will redound to the broader social and economic context.  
They may result from the fact that the undercompensated parties and those 
who sympathize with them feel less secure in their tenure in their own 
property,82 or they may be the direct result of the resentment felt by the 
undercompensated parties, which may be expressed in destructive “social 
unrest.”  This second hypothetical is, of course, especially relevant to the 
Chinese context.  One scholar, who theorizes that the current takings system 
may actually be economically efficient insofar as it eliminates the 
negotiation costs that would be required for developers to acquire land by 
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other means, eventually concludes that these added efficiencies are 
outweighed by the long-term detrimental effects on China’s economy that 
result from takings-related social unrest.83  
Seen from this perspective, the analysis in the first paragraph of this 
Part seems specious:  the failure to compensate individuals does produce 
efficiency effects.  These are related to demoralization costs and, while more 
diffuse and more difficult to measure, may also be more broadly and 
lastingly destructive than, say, the systematic under-use of land.  Unlike the 
inefficiencies that might be expected to result from underpayment by 
governments and developers, the destructive social unrest that results from 
underpayment to Chinese farmers is empirically observable. 
Several related analyses that focus on the inefficiency of unfairness 
point to a new way of understanding the effects of the expropriation surplus.  
Mark Roe has proposed that economic systems that maximize total wealth in 
the short-term, but distribute that wealth in a radically and visibly unequal 
way, may eventually give rise to “wealth-decreasing political instability” 
that could render the systems themselves unsustainable and certainly do 
render them inefficient in the long run.84  Another case study suggests that 
perceived inequity in transactional terms can delay and increase the costs of 
completing even transactions that would otherwise produce “large ex post 
aggregate gains.” 85   These analyses support the demoralization costs 
approach insofar as they share the assumption that social dissatisfaction and 
unrest can be wealth-decreasing.   
However, they also point to the role of inequalities, as opposed to 
simple under-compensation, in creating demoralization costs.  The 
expropriation surplus represents a very visible inequality:  farmers receive 
compensation for their land at one value and then see local governments 
resell the land at another.  In other words, the problem with the expropriation 
surplus may not simply be that it induces governments to expropriate, 
thereby resulting in the demoralization costs that result from low 
compensation.  Instead, the expropriation surplus may also directly increase 
demoralization costs, by creating an appearance of inequality. 86   This 
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observation is related to the observation that “givings” by governments to 
select parties can generate just as much demoralization among those not 
selected for “givings” as takings can.87 
Another approach, compatible with, but different from, the 
demoralization costs approach, provides another reason to worry about the 
perceived unfairness of the current compensation system.  Henry Smith and 
Thomas Merrill have argued that utilitarian law-and-economics approaches 
to property rights, such as the “efficiency” analysis of takings discussed in 
Part III.B.1. above, are unsatisfactory because they ignore the extent to 
which ethical imperatives structure the law and social expectations of private 
property. 88  Moral assumptions, according to Smith and Merrill, help to 
coordinate the behavior of individuals so that property systems can function: 
“[p]roperty can function as property only if the vast preponderance of 
persons recognize that property is a moral right.”89  In the absence of a 
system of widely-recognized moral assumptions surrounding property, 
violation of property rights will be rampant, for the simple reason that legal 
and self-help enforcement of these rights will always be insufficient to 
protect an in rem right that must be defended against an unlimited number of 
potential violators. 90   In China, where a functional system of private 
property is still in its formative stages, wide recognition of property as a 
moral right could be especially valuable in this coordinating role.  Yet, to the 
extent that individuals perceive under-compensated takings of agricultural 
land as a violation of a farmer’s moral rights to land she possesses and farms, 
such takings are likely to weaken this recognition.  To the extent that the 
internalization of a property right’s consciousness will help to increase 
overall prosperity in China, such takings are therefore likely to represent a 
drag on total wealth.91 
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3. Loss of Agricultural Land 
 
Expropriation of rural land represents a change not only in ownership 
of land but also in its use; therefore, China’s land use regime is as crucial a 
factor in these transactions as are those aspects of its legal system that deal 
specifically with expropriation.  A common criticism of the interaction of 
these two systems is that the expropriation regime undermines the goals of 
the land use regime. 
As discussed in Part II.B., above, Article 43 of the LAL forbids the 
use of collectively-owned land for any but a few limited purposes.  Multiple 
other articles of the LAL emphasize a commitment to controlling the pace of 
conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses.  For example, 
Article 31 provides that there should be no net loss of agricultural land—any 
agricultural land that is developed must be offset by the reclamation of an 
equal amount of new land for agricultural use, either by the developer or by 
local governments.92  The Property Law reiterates this concern as well.93  A 
2004 Circular from the State Council focuses specifically on measures to 
protect the supply of arable land,94  and a 2006 Circular from the State 
Council reiterates the government’s concern about the too-rapid 
development of farmland.95  For most observers, the Chinese government’s 
interest in “halt[ing] or at least retard[ing] the conversion of arable land to 
non-agricultural uses”96 and in “protect[ing] environmental and agricultural 
lands” is a given.97    
This policy appears to originate at least in part with environmental 
and land-use planning principles.  According to one scholar, ensuring 
security of the food supply is a major goal of the policy. 98  Ironically, the 
major concern motivating the government in recent years may be worry 
about the social side effects of displacing farmers from their land.  This 
concern is integrally tied to a fairly paternalistic view of Chinese farmers as 
subject to exploitation in market transactions.  If agricultural land could be 
freely traded for other uses, the reasoning goes, unscrupulous speculators 
                                                 
92
 LAL, supra note 25, at art. 31.  See also LAL, supra note 25, at arts. 4, 18, 32-42. 
93
 Property Law, supra note 14, at art. 42. 
94
 Guowuyuan guanyu jiang bufen tudi churangjin yongyu nongye tudi kaifa youguan wenti de 
tongzhi [Circular on Relevant Issues Concerning Using Part of the Land Transfer Fees for the Expansion of 
Cultivated Land] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=3484&keyword= (P.R.C.). 
95
 2006 Land Control Circular, supra note 39, at preamble. 
96
 Clarke, supra note 61, at 1. 
97
 Chengri Ding, supra note 16, at 113.   See also Decision on Major Issues, supra note 28. 
98
 Stein, supra note 15, at 32-33.  
96 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 1 
 
and developers could persuade farmers to sell at prices that would be unfair 
to the farmers. 99   That reasoning is certainly at odds with the market 
orientation that has guided most reforms of the Chinese rural land regime 
over the past several decades, but it may be the inevitable result of the 
current political calculus in that country, by which, for example, leftist 
commentators were partially responsible for delaying the passage of the new 
Property Law.100  
Prohibiting most development of collectively-owned land at first 
glance might seem like a reasonable strategy in light of these concerns.  
However, the fact that expropriation rescinds this prohibition for any given 
piece of land, coupled with the existence of the expropriation surplus, dooms 
the strategy to failure.   Not only do local governments have the means to lift 
this prohibition on land within their jurisdiction, they have a substantial 
financial motivation to do so.  The act of expropriation both transfers a piece 
of property into the government’s hands and raises the value of that property, 
by opening it up to a wider array of uses.  By restricting the potential uses of 
collectively-owned land, the national government sets the stage for that rise 
in value and provides incentives for local governments to engage in 
expropriation.  The end result—conversion of agricultural land to other uses, 
and the displacement of farmers, often resulting in social unrest—is 
precisely what the rural land use restrictions were originally intended to 
avoid, hence the irony noted above. 
A number of scholars have already identified the problem just 
described. 101   Several scholars have also used the term “monopoly” to 
describe the position held by local governments in this process.  The idea is 
that local governments are the only parties that can engage in the value-
creating activity of changing the permitted use of a piece of land.102  While 
the analogy of local governments to monopoly sellers may be useful, it may 
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overstate the extent to which the Chinese land use regime is unique in this 
regard.  Land use restrictions, after all, are always created by, and can only 
be changed or relaxed by, governments.  Nor is the fact that local 
governments have strong financial motivations to allow certain use changes 
unique to the Chinese context.  U.S. local governments, for example, 
frequently engage in varieties of “fiscal zoning,” which subordinates stated 
land use goals to the pursuit of the government’s own financial health.103  Of 
course, in the case of the United States, the government’s fiscal motives are 
much more attenuated, based as they are on the projected (but never entirely 
certain) effects of a given land use decision on property tax revenues.  In 
China, by contrast, a substantial portion of the vast differences between the 
value of a parcel of land under agricultural restrictions and the value of that 
same parcel after those restrictions are removed goes directly and 
immediately into the pockets of local governments.  Nonetheless, this 
comparison is a useful reminder that the expropriation problem in rural 
China is as much a problem of land use controls as an eminent domain 
problem.  
The power of the expropriation surplus is such that the array of 
government measures to halt or retard the conversion and net loss of 
farmland have been largely ineffective.  Between 1986 and 1995, China lost 
more than 1.9 million hectares of farmland to construction and urban 
expansion, and by 1995 per capita farmland was down to 1167 square meters, 
well below the world average of 2333 square meters.104  One study estimates 
that the supply of arable land is decreasing at a rate of one percent a year.105  
These statistics indicate that Article 31 of the LAL, requiring that all 
converted agricultural land be replaced, is an ineffective counterweight to 
the expropriation surplus, perhaps because it is poorly enforced or 
compliance is impossible in many instances.   
In summation, the expropriation surplus is the product of the 
interaction of the country’s system of laws pertaining to land use and its 
laws pertaining directly to expropriation.  That interaction ends up 
undermining the key goal of the former set of laws—ensuring the 
preservation of agricultural land—and, in turn, aggravating the problems—
displacement of farmers and rural unrest—that are part of the inspiration for 
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that goal in the first place.  The empirical question of how much agricultural 
land China needs from a land use perspective does not need to be answered 
in order to determine that the loss of such land is a problem to the extent that 
rural unrest produces the demoralization costs described in Part III.B.2. 
above.  
 
4. Insecurity of Tenure and Underinvestment in Agricultural Land 
 
A number of Western scholars, most of whom are affiliated with the 
Seattle, Washington-based Rural Development Institute (“RDI”), have dwelt 
on one particular negative effect of the current expropriation system:  that it 
undermines the perceived security of Chinese farmers’ tenure in the land that 
they farm, thereby discouraging investment in that land and hindering 
agricultural productivity growth.106  This effect constitutes a subset of the 
demoralization costs described in Part III.B.2.—a clear example of 
Michelman’s “impaired incentives.”107  
Two separate causal mechanisms would seem to link expropriations to 
reduced agricultural investment.  First, the mere fact that expropriation is 
fairly common reduces farmers’ incentives to invest.  A second, and closely 
related, factor is that the statutory compensation formula is unlikely to take 
into account the effects of recent investments, particularly more long-term 
investments, on the future output of agricultural land. 108  
These two mechanisms in turn point to different features of the 
expropriation system as sources of the problem.  The first mechanism is 
intimately related to the expropriation surplus, insofar as that surplus creates 
incentives for local governments to engage in frequent expropriations.  It is 
also dependent on the second mechanism—if compensation were sufficient 
to reimburse farmers for all investments in agricultural productivity, then 
expropriation would not reduce the incentives for such investments. 
The second mechanism is not so closely related to the expropriation 
surplus but instead is related to the absolute amount of compensation paid to 
individual farmers.  This amount is likely to fall short for any investments 
that do not constitute fixtures on the land (and hence not covered by the 
fixtures and standing crops payments) and that are either quite recent or for 
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other reasons were expected to yield benefits in the years following the 
expropriation that are not reflected in agricultural productivity in the three 
years immediately prior to the expropriation. 
 
5. Violations of Related Laws 
 
Illegal land uses and transactions are widespread throughout both 
rural and urban areas; “legal transactions constitute only a part, albeit a 
majority, of all land use transactions.”109  One very common subcategory of 
these violations of law is the “illegal use of collectively owned land by rural 
commercial users.”110   The prevalence of such illegal use, I will argue, 
constitutes both an index and a destructive effect of the rural land 
expropriation system’s failures.  
As discussed in Part II.C., expropriation is required for the conversion 
of agricultural land to most other uses, and the use of collectively-owned 
land for most commercial purposes is illegal.  Yet it takes place with striking 
frequency111  and is especially common at the fringes of large, growing 
cities.112  The participants in this sort of illegal land use are most likely to be 
urban commercial users, and the collective landowners who transact with 
them to allow the illegal use.  For example, a rural collective might pay 
peasant households to relinquish their LURs in cultivated land and then 
contract with a commercial user who will pay the collective for the right to 
develop the land. 113   In other cases, a collective might pay peasant 
households to relinquish their LURs and then enter into a joint venture with 
a commercial user to develop the land, claiming an equity stake in the 
project rather than rent from the commercial user.114 
In other cases, collectives do not even bother partnering with an urban 
commercial user but instead simply develop land they have reclaimed from 
peasant users, at a price, on their own and retain all the profits.115  It appears 
that, in at least some situations of this sort, the collective passes the lion’s 
share of the profits on to its peasant members, who may enjoy a very good 
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living from these proceeds.116  In still other cases, the party transacting with 
the urban commercial user might be a township-village enterprise (“TVE”). 
As discussed above, TVEs are the only parties permitted to use collectively-
owned land for commercial purposes. 117   A TVE might find it more 
profitable, however, to subcontract or otherwise transfer its LURs in 
collectively-owned land to a non-TVE commercial entity at a relatively high 
price, and evidence suggests that numerous TVE managers succumb to this 
temptation.118  
What all the illegal transactions just described have in common is that 
they allow non-state land users to bypass the expropriation system, and, in 
so doing, to obtain a portion or all of the expropriation surplus that is 
usually retained by the state in use conversion-expropriation transactions.  
For example, in the first form of transaction, all parties may be willing to 
participate, despite the transaction’s illegality and attendant risks, because 
each gets to enjoy a portion of the expropriation surplus that would 
otherwise be claimed by the state.  Unfortunately, though understandably, no 
empirical evidence exists to demonstrate how parties to such transactions 
share the pilfered expropriation surplus among themselves.  It is entirely 
possible, for example, that peasant users actually receive very little or none 
of the surplus through the sums paid by the collective for cancellation of 
their LURs, because they either are unaware of or lack the means to enforce 
their statutory rights to retain those LURs for the duration of their thirty-year 
term.119 
Like many black markets, the prevalence of illegal transactions 
suggests that the underlying system of rules is not wealth-maximizing.  
Parties find it more profitable, it seems, to allocate rights among themselves 
outside of the legal channels for doing so.120  All this demonstrates once 
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118
 Che Yubin, supra note 33, at 86. 
119
 But see Che Yubin, supra note 33, at 86; Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu, supra note 63, at 26 
(both suggesting that peasant users do generally get premium prices for their cancelled LURs in these 
circumstances). 
120
 What is perhaps most telling about all these transactions is the fact that local governments allow 
them to continue, not in spite of the fact that they are illegal, but in spite of the fact that they divide the 
expropriation surplus that would normally be enjoyed mostly by local governments between different 
parties (collectives, commercial users, farmers).  The fact that local governments do not always step in to 
expropriate the land and preserve the surplus for themselves when this occurs is puzzling.  It may, however, 
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again the importance of the expropriation surplus in the current legal regime, 
and the extent to which the expropriation surplus is created by the land use 
regulations governing collectively-owned land—after all, the laws being 
violated above do not pertain specifically to the expropriation process but 
instead to the permitted uses of collective land.  The efficiency problem 
indicated by this illegal behavior here is a land use problem, not an eminent 
domain problem.  
This illegal behavior exacerbates drawbacks of the current system 
even as it serves as an index of them.  First, the presence of a black market 
in land hinders the development of transparent, efficient markets in, and 
pricing mechanisms for, land.121   Second, the fact that rural collectives, 
commercial users, and farmers may reap profits, extensive in some cases, by 
violating existing laws can only contribute to the demoralization costs 
described in Part III.B.2.  If scholars are able to identify instances of illegal 
commercial use of collective land, then surely residents of neighboring 
villages and an array of commercial developers are aware of this 
phenomenon as well.  If a peasant loses his land via expropriation and 
receives only statutory compensation, knowing that others in a comparable 
position have received compensation that is closer to the value of the land 
for commercial uses, his demoralization is likely to be greater than it would 
have been absent this knowledge.  
 
IV. OTHER PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
Part III.B. identified five major potential negative effects of the 
current system surrounding the expropriation of rural land.  The conclusion 
that emerges from that discussion is that the system is economically 
destructive, but not perhaps in the way that a facile application of many 
efficiency-oriented American takings analyses would suggest.  The problem 
is not that the ability to expropriate land at currently prevailing levels of 
compensation necessarily leads to expropriation for inefficient purposes.  
Instead, the inefficiencies of the underlying land use regime lead to frequent 
expropriation, and low levels of compensation in turn lead to wealth-
destroying social unrest, to insufficient investment in agricultural land, to 
illegal activity that possibly heightens general dissatisfaction, and perhaps to 
                                                                                                                                               
represent subtle support for the demoralization costs argument made in Part III.B.2, above.  Demoralization, 
and the likelihood of social unrest, is likely to increase with the value of the entitlement that is taken away.  
Local governments may recognize a greater likelihood of social unrest when they take not just agricultural 
rights in land but rights to a share in the expropriation surplus, and may tread with caution as a result.   
121
 Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.63, at 27. 
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the retardation of the process of building a functional property rights 
consciousness in China.  
The expropriation surplus, discussed in Part III.A., therefore comes to 
seem like something of a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, it induces 
what may be the fundamentally efficient act of transforming less valuable 
collective land into more valuable state-owned urban land.  However, to the 
extent that that transformation’s fundamental efficiency is overwhelmed by 
the destructive effects just named, the expropriation surplus is problematic. 
Part V will argue that the most direct way to mitigate these destructive 
effects is to eliminate the expropriation surplus by separating the economic 
consequences of urbanization from the administrative process of changing 
the ownership and use status of rural land.  First, however, this Part will 
consider several other frequently-proffered solutions and will show that 
these solutions are unlikely to be effective on their own. 
 
A. Strengthening the “Public Interest” Requirement 
 
Some observers have urged the Chinese government to improve the 
expropriation system by strengthening or further enforcing the “public 
interest” requirement found in Article 10 of the constitution. 122   These 
observers generally propose that the government should have the right to 
expropriate land through non-negotiated transactions, without the consent of 
current owners or users, but only when the land is being taken for a 
legitimate public use,123 and that current owners or users should have the 
right to challenge acts of expropriation on the grounds that they are not in 
fact in the public interest. 124   This would represent a major, indeed 
revolutionary, change to the current system; as was discussed above, the 
public use requirement is not currently defined or elaborated upon anywhere 
in Chinese statutory law, and the reality is that expropriation of land for 
profit-bearing development by private entities is extremely common.125 
                                                 
122
 XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.). 
123
 Larson, supra note 25, at 854; Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 29; Property Seizure in China, supra 
note 8, at 14 (testimony of Roy L. Prosterman).  See also Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 293-94 (proposing 
such a requirement for the requisition of urban state-owned land from current private users).  One pair of 
scholars, however, have proposed that expropriation for non-public purposes be retained as a possibility but 
that additional compensation be required in such instances.  Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu, supra note 63, 
at 27.  
124
 Larson, supra note 25 at 854.  
125
 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text; see also Theresa Wang, Comment, Trading the 
People’s Homes for the People’s Olympics: The Property Regime in China, 15 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
599, 616 (2006) (pointing out that terms like “public purposes” or “public necessity” are necessarily 
ambiguous in an officially Communist country). 
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Under these proposals, which are favored by affiliates of the U.S.-
based RDI, 126 the state would be forced to purchase collective land at a 
mutually agreed-upon price if it planned to use the land for purposes other 
than the public interest.  The most difficult question is, of course, how 
“public interest” should be defined.  The best option would almost certainly 
be a detailed statutory definition of the phrase.  RDI proposes limiting the 
use of land in “the public interest” to the construction of infrastructure 
projects with clear public benefits, such as power plants, government 
buildings, and highways, and to projects with broader “economic 
development” benefits, but only with the approval of the State Council.127  
The major problem with this proposal is that it grants the State Council 
substantial definitional discretion.  The national government is entitled to a 
portion of the expropriation surplus (thirty percent of the fees generated by 
transferring LURs to private parties) in all expropriation transactions.128  The 
State Council therefore would have an incentive to deem projects to be in the 
public interest so as to reduce the amount of compensation paid, assuming 
that the statutory formula will yield a lower figure than negotiation.  All in 
all, though this proposal would eliminate the potential for the worst local 
abuses, it could mean that the number of expropriation transactions at the 
current compensation levels, and the resulting demoralization costs and 
reduced incentives for farmers, might not be substantially reduced from the 
present state of affairs. 129  
A variation on the RDI proposal, in which economic development 
projects could not be deemed in the public interest with State Council 
approval, and only public infrastructure projects could be designated as such, 
would eliminate this potential conflict.  However, it is telling that the RDI 
did not choose to propose such a restrictive definition of “the public interest.”  
American commentators, including the RDI affiliates and the author of this 
Article, may have little moral authority to propose such a definition.  After 
all, American courts have ruled that even the narrower-sounding phrase 
“public use” can include vague public goods like economic development and 
                                                 
126
 Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 46, 52 (prepared statement of Brian Schwarzwalder et 
al.). 
127
 Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 46 (prepared statement of Brian Schwarzwalder et al.). 
128
 LAL, supra note 25, at art. 55; Yue Zhenghua, supra  note 64, at 32. 
129
 The RDI proposal also involves raising the statutory formula for compensation for projects 
deemed to be in the public interest.  Id. at 52.  However, that portion of the proposal, as will be discussed 
infra Part IV, seems unlikely to eliminate the expropriation surplus to the extent necessary to substantially 
mitigate the current system’s problems. 
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beautification, 130  and can encompass projects that generate substantial 
benefit for private parties.131  Indeed, the American interpretation of “public 
use” even encompasses the generation of increased tax revenues for local 
governments. 132  It is difficult to argue that this principle does not extend to 
the potential conclusion that the expropriation surplus is itself in the public 
interest, as it enriches the coffers of state entities that exist ostensibly to 
serve that interest. 
Finally, one more point that should not be overlooked is that proposals 
to strengthen the public use requirement might not sufficiently address the 
demoralization costs and impaired incentives that result from too little 
compensation being paid to peasant land users.  After all, the especially 
deadly incident of civil unrest in Dongzhou resulted from the expropriation 
of land for a public works project (a power plant).133  
 
B. Increased Compensation 
 
It would seem that the most direct way to reduce both the 
expropriation surplus and demoralization costs from takings is to increase 
the amount of compensation paid to collectives and farmers in fulfillment.  
However, most proposals for doing so to date are either of dubious 
effectiveness or liable to create as many problems as they solve.  
 
1.  Fair Market Value Compensation 
 
An interesting contrast emerges when one studies the different 
proposals for reforming the compensation system offered by Western and 
Chinese observers.  Almost uniformly, Western scholars advocate the 
replacement of the current statutory compensation formula with a 
requirement that farmers receive the fair market value of their rights in 
                                                 
130
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (upholding the exercise of eminent domain 
for “economic rejuvenation”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (upholding the exercise of 
eminent domain for a program of slum clearance and aesthetic improvement).  But see County of Wayne v. 
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786-87 (Mich. 2004) (holding that incidental economic benefit resulting from 
private business development is not a valid public use under state constitutional law).  See also Abraham 
Bell & Gideon Parchomovksy, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (2006) (arguing 
that a public use requirement on eminent domain without compensation makes governments more likely to 
abridge property rights through regulatory means); Joseph L. Sax, Kelo: A Case Rightly Decided, 28 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 365, 369 (2006) (arguing that distinguishing between public and private uses is increasingly 
difficult even in the American context). 
131
 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485-87; Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984). 
132
 E.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (citing “new jobs and increased tax revenue” as “benefits to the 
community”). 
133
 See Lethal Attack, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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expropriated land.134  Chinese observers also commonly recommend that fair 
market value be taken into consideration in any new standard135 but are, in 
general, more likely to recommend that the compensation also be designed 
with an eye toward maintaining farmers’ current standards of living.136  One 
or both of these two concerns inform most proposals for compensation 
reform; unfortunately, both of these concerns can be somewhat unproductive. 
Advocates for a fair market value compensation system proceed quite 
reasonably from the assumption that such a standard will bring 
compensation as close as possible to duplicating the effects of a voluntary 
transaction.  Additionally, “fair market value” seems, particularly from an 
American perspective, an accessible, tried-and-true standard, which has been 
used, to non-disastrous results, to compensate for takings both in the United 
States and under several international systems for years.137 
However, fair market value compensation is unlikely to solve the 
expropriation problems in rural China.  First, that standard will probably not 
come close to eliminating the expropriation surplus.  The prototypical fair 
market value proposal seems to assume that the market value will be 
determined only with reference to the uses currently permitted on the land 
by applicable law.138  That is, at any rate, how the standard is applied in the 
                                                 
134
 See, e.g., Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 52-53 (prepared statement of Brian 
Schwarzwalder et al.).  This proposal, made by affiliates of RDI, asserts that fair market value should be 
the baseline compensation standard but that a higher multiple of annual average agricultural output may be 
used instead if the market value of land cannot be discerned.  In addition, as this proposal would require 
negotiated prices for all transfers of collective land to the state for non-public purposes, the fair market 
value compensation standard would apply only where land was taken for public purposes.  Id. at 46.  See 
also Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 294 (advocating that “fair market value” be the compensation standard for 
takings of urban land use rights). 
135
 Guo Dexiang, Lun wo guo nongdi zhengyong buchang zhidu cunzai de went [Discussion of the 
Problems with China’s Current System of Compensation for Expropriation of Agricultural Land], 185 
JIGUAN JINGJI YANJIU 98, 98 (2005); Wang Youqiang & Dong Hong, Wo guo nongdi zhengyong buchang 
zhidu wenti tantao [Exploration of Problems with the Chinese System of Compensation for Expropriation 
of Agricultural Land], 2 SHAANXI NONGYE KEXUE 117, 118 (2005); Zhou Qiren, supra note 46, at 24. 
136
 Guo Dexiang, supra note 136, at 98; Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 29; Liu Zuoxiang, supra note 59, 
at  91; Wang Youqiang & Dong Hong, supra note 136, at 118. 
137
 See Thomas Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 110 (2002) 
(discussing the export of the fair market value standard used in American federal constitutional 
jurisprudence to the North American Free Trade Association’s takings law). 
138
 Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 52 (prepared statement of Brian Schwarzwalder et al.).  
But see, e.g., Yin Shibo & Yu Dan, Jianli fuhe shichang jingji guize de zhengdi buchang anzhi xin zhidu 
[Establishing a New System for Expropriation Compensation and Resettlement that Conforms to Market 
Principles], SHANGCHANG XIANDAIHUA, Oct. 2005 (proposing that compensation be at fair market value of 
the land if all commercial development uses were considered).  Yin Shibo and Yu Dan’s article and similar 
proposals will be discussed infra, Part IV.B. 
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United States139 and for takings in urban China.140  Yet a sizable portion of 
the expropriation surplus is contributed by the difference between the land’s 
value under the use restrictions associated with collective ownership, and its 
value once those restrictions are removed. Therefore, incentives for local 
governments to expropriate will remain. 141   If fair market value 
compensation leads to higher compensation, some of the demoralization 
costs of the current system might subside; but, to the extent that those costs 
arise from the perceivable inequity between the prices paid and received by 
local governments, these costs will remain. 
Second, critiques of fair market value compensation standards in non-
Chinese contexts resonate with the problems currently present in the Chinese 
system, and suggest that fair market value compensation will fail to reduce 
demoralization costs substantially.  It has been noted that fair market value 
in a takings context is essentially a “fiction”:  the officials who set 
compensation have no way of knowing what price the owner of a given 
piece of property might actually have demanded in a voluntary 
transaction.142  Fair market value is defined as the price that a willing seller 
and willing buyer would have reached through negotiation; but, like fair 
market value itself, the price demanded by a willing seller is an uncertain 
variable.143  Fair market value compensation, at least as applied in the United 
States, ignores all individualized value property may have for its owner, 
including lost future profits, business goodwill, subjective or sentimental 
value, and costs of relocating.144   
A third, and perhaps the least debatable, objection to the fair market 
value standard is that it is most likely impossible to apply effectively in the 
                                                 
139
 E.g., Almota Farmers Elevator and Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 478 (1973); 
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16-17, 21 (1970); United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 
624, 639 (1961); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943). 
140
 See Wilhlem, supra note 16, at 265-66.   
141
 In all fairness, the RDI proposal does attempt to answer this objection by allowing involuntary 
takings only for public purposes, perhaps on the theory that this restriction will eliminate the expropriation 
surplus. Supra note 134. However, for reasons discussed supra, Part III.B.2., this measure is unlikely to 
remove the expropriation surplus effectively or entirely. 
142
 Merrill, supra note 138, at 116. 
143
 Nathan Burdsal, Note, Just Compensation and the Seller’s Paradox, 20 B.Y.U.  J. PUB. L. 79, 91-
93 (2005). 
144
 Merrill, supra note 138, at 118-19.  See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 
35-71 (University of Chicago Press 1993); Garnett, supra note 86, at 947 (on the “uncompensated 
subjective loss” from takings); Ann E. Gergan, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just Compensation, 14 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 181, 201 (1993).  But see Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political 
Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 104 (suggesting that American scholars have tended 
to “overstate the undercompensation problem” and that relocation assistance requirements may outweigh 
any undercompensation resulting from the failure to include subjective value in fair market value 
calculations in the United States).  
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current Chinese context.  While a market in agricultural LURs has been 
developing since the 1990s, that market remains relatively immature.145  It is 
not clear when or whether market data will exist sufficient to allow reliable, 
objective determinations of fair market value for agricultural land.  
Moreover, fair market value is a vaguer standard than the standard currently 
used and, as such, is more subject to discretion and abuse by decision-
making officials. 
 
2. Social Safety Nets  
 
Standing in rather sharp contrast to the fair market value proposals is 
the emphasis, frequently seen in Chinese articles on the subject, on ensuring 
that compensation guarantees farmers a standard of living equivalent to that 
which they enjoyed before expropriation.146  Fair market value proposals are, 
at least ostensibly, geared toward duplicating the effects of market 
transactions, whereas standard of living proposals treat land use rights not as 
a market commodity, but as a social safety net.  Related to this standard of 
living emphasis are proposals that stress that farmers should not be given the 
compensation they are due as a one-time cash payment but should instead 
receive annuities from special funds or even in-kind forms of compensation 
like shares or jobs, which are presumably more likely to constitute a long-
term, non-squanderable form of social security.147 
Much more than the fair market value emphasis, the standard of living 
emphasis has been tentatively welcomed by the Chinese government.  As 
was discussed above, both the Property Law and a 2004 Ministry of Land 
Resources circular reiterated a commitment to the maintenance of farmers’ 
standard of living, as did the Decision on Major Issues.148  However, this 
emphasis can only go so far toward curing the system’s present pathologies.  
First, as was the case with fair market value proposals, these proposals will 
not do much to eliminate the expropriation surplus and, hence, 
demoralization costs that derive directly from the perception of inequity that 
it causes.  Farmers’ standard of living is, after all, based on agricultural 
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 Stein, supra note 15, at 43; see also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
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 Guo Dexiang, supra note 136, at 98; Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 29; Wang Youqiang & Dong Hong, 
supra note 136, at 119. 
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 Fu Shiming & Wang Yong, Zhengdi buchang biaozhun de shiwu qiquan fenxi [An Options 
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income, which is dramatically lower in absolute terms than returns earned on 
industrial or commercial enterprises.  It is estimated that current 
compensation levels are generally sufficient to support displaced farmers for 
seven to ten years following an expropriation.149  Even if compensation were 
multiplied by a factor of five, so as to provide thirty-five to fifty years of 
support at a pre-expropriation level, they would still fall far short of the 
sums to be earned by converting land to commercial use.150 
Second, it is also quite likely that merely providing enough 
compensation to duplicate farmers’ previous income levels will not ensure 
their economic support once they have lost their land.  What the impressive 
size of the expropriation surplus illustrates so vividly is the massive 
economic gap between urban and rural China.  Once land moves from the 
rural to the urban economy, its value increases drastically because returns 
from non-agricultural pursuits far outstrip those from agricultural pursuits.  
Accordingly, average urban income is over three times the average rural 
income in China. 151   Therefore, even compensation that successfully 
duplicates entirely the income from expropriated agricultural land is not 
likely to support a particularly comfortable life for farmers who decide or 
are forced to move to an urban area after losing their land, or who might lose 
their land as part of a process by which their village is incorporated into the 
urban economy of a nearby city.152  
Chinese law does, in fact, recognize the impossibility of converting a 
rural social safety net into a decent urban livelihood.  It is perhaps for this 
reason that governments have been urged to provide occupational training, 
non-agricultural jobs, or urban residence permits (which carry with them a 
wide array of social services, among them educational and health 
entitlements, not available to rural residents) in lieu of cash as resettlement 
assistance.  The idea behind these measures is to provide displaced farmers 
not with the (rural) standard of living they enjoyed before expropriation but, 
perhaps, with a standard of living that is roughly analogous to their former 
standard in an urban context.  However, a recent survey has shown that 
farmers increasingly prefer cash to jobs or urban residence permits as 
compensation.153  It is not difficult to guess why:  promised salaries are often 
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 Guo Dexiang, supra note 136, at 98 (estimating seven years); Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu, 
supra note 63, at 26 (estimating ten years). 
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 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
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 Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 12 (statement of Roy L. Prosterman).   
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diverted, and favoritism or corruption sometimes interferes with the 
provision of job opportunities or other in-kind assistance.154 
All this points to a third reason why the “former standard of living” 
approach to compensation may be ultimately unproductive and may in fact 
cause as many problems as it solves.  Attempts to guarantee a certain 
standard of living indefinitely, and particularly attempts to do so through 
mechanisms other than one-time cash payments, put farmers at the mercy of 
notoriously corrupt local governments and hamper the development of free 
markets in rural land and labor.  Taken too literally, this standard threatens 
to enhance the role of the state in the rural economy and hearkens back to 
rural China’s history of more intensive economic planning.155  These effects, 
in turn, might both increase opportunities for corruption and resulting social 
unrest, and decrease the likely efficiency of land use and economic ventures 
in rural areas.  They also run counter to the prevailing trend in rural land 
reform in the last few years, which has emphasized the strengthening of 
economic incentives and market factors in rural economies and lifestyles.156  
 
V. ELIMINATING THE EXPROPRIATION SURPLUS, PRESERVING THE 
URBANIZATION SURPLUS: TRANSFERABLE LAND DEVELOPMENT 
RIGHTS 
 
This Part will present an alternative proposal for reform.  This 
proposal, which is inspired by, but more elaborate than, suggestions offered 
by several Chinese scholars, is not merely a proposal for raising 
compensation.  Instead, it is a proposal for creating and monetizing land 
development rights.  As such, it recognizes that the current “takings” 
problem in rural China is as much a land use problem as an eminent domain 
problem; and it seeks to fulfill the two potentially, but not necessarily, 
conflicting goals of enhancing economic efficiency and distributive justice 
in the rural land economy. 
 
A. Decoupling the Urbanization Surplus from Expropriation 
 
Reducing or eliminating the expropriation surplus might seem the 
logical foundation of a proposal to fulfill those goals.  After all, eliminating 
the expropriation surplus would eliminate the incentive of local governments 
                                                 
154
 Id. at 666, 669-70. 
155
 Guo Dexiang, supra note 136, at 98. 
156
 See supra Part II.B. 
110 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 1 
 
to expropriate and the demoralizing impression of inequality among 
condemnees.  However, as was hinted at in Part III.B.1., the very existence 
of the surplus probably indicates that there is a shortage of buildable land 
and an excess of land designated for agricultural use in China today.  To the 
extent that the surplus induces parties to move rural land to a more profitable 
use, it serves a positive function.  
A more productive approach stems from recognition of the fact, 
touched upon in Part III.A., that the expropriation surplus is actually the 
product of two phenomena:  the existence of an urbanization surplus (that is, 
an increase in the value of land that results from its conversion from rural to 
urban uses), and a land use regime that does a very poor job of meeting its 
ostensible goals of controlling the pace of urbanization and preserving 
agricultural land.  On its own, the urbanization surplus is a positive factor:  it 
represents the value generated by economic development.157  At present, the 
restrictions on the use of collective land mean the urbanization surplus can 
only be enjoyed as a result of the expropriation process.  If the urbanization 
surplus can be detached from the expropriation process, the expropriation 
surplus will diminish.  
 
B. Recognizing Current Land Use Restrictions as a Regulatory Taking 
 
Recognizing the potential value of separating the urbanization surplus 
from the expropriation process, several scholars have proposed that the 
difference between the land use restrictions applicable to state-owned and 
collective land simply be eliminated.  In theory, this would require a 
constitutional amendment (to Article 10) and would allow collectives and 
farmers to enjoy the urbanization surplus by transferring LURs freely to 
commercial users.  It would also validate a plethora of illegal practices 
which, at this point, are quite common.158  Several scholars have proposed 
this fairly radical solution,159 with one noting that it will break a pernicious 
“monopoly” by local governments on the land conversion process.160  Also, 
quite surprisingly and apparently in defiance of Article 10, in 2005 the 
provincial government of Guangdong adopted a pilot program that 
essentially allows the circulation of collectively-owned land for a wider 
array of private construction uses, so long as that construction complies with 
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other relevant land use laws.161  The city of Shanghai is reported to have 
launched a similar program for collective land within its boundaries as 
well.162   
The problem with this approach, as discussed above, 163  is that it 
ignores the fact that all alterable land use regulation represents a government 
monopoly over a potentially lucrative process, and that the benefits of this 
monopoly, in a healthy land use regime, are generally seen as outweighing 
its costs.  In this case, the Chinese national government has evinced a 
genuine concern with restricting the conversion of agricultural land to other 
uses.  Questioning the validity of that concern is not within the mission of 
this analysis, and in fact few scholars appear to have ventured such 
questioning.  The collective/state ownership dichotomy has become its 
major tool for accomplishing this goal.  Eliminating the restrictions on 
collective land would require the drafting of a new system of land use 
controls, and any new system would inevitably disadvantage the economic 
rights of farmers, just as the current one does.  This is the case because of a 
fundamental fact about land use regulation:  where governments seek to 
preserve or compel a certain less-profitable use of land (and most land use 
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 Guangdong sheng jiti jianshedi shiyongquan liuzhuan guanli banfa [Administrative Measures of 
Guangdong Province for the Circulation of Use Rights to Collectively-Owned Construction Land] art. 4 
(promulgated by the People’s Government of Guangdong Province, June 23, 2005, effective Oct. 1, 2005), 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=4436&keyword= (P.R.C.).  As 
potentially revolutionary as the Guangdong Measures are, they fall short of a comprehensive solution of the 
expropriation problem for several reasons.  First, the Measures specifically do not allow the development of 
collectively-owned land for commercial housing, one of the more lucrative potential uses.  Id. art. 5.  
Second, and most damningly, the Measures note that collectively-owned construction land will remain 
subject to expropriation by the state but do not address the question of how compensation should be 
determined in these cases.  Id. art. 9.  Presumably the current statutory model, based on agricultural output, 
would be irrelevant and unworkable.  If compensation were calculated through a formula analogous to that 
currently used for agricultural land—that is, based on average income from construction uses for the three 
years preceding the expropriation—ample potential for under-compensation would exist, as many new 
development projects would likely take much longer than three years to reach a level of profitability 
sufficient to justify initial investment.  Finally, it is not clear that these Measures would allow individual 
farming households to enjoy any profits from the increased range of permissible uses; the Measures appear 
to envision a situation in which farmers’ LURs are still contractually limited to agricultural uses, and only 
collective owners are permitted to extract higher rents from commercial users.  The Measures require that 
half of the proceeds from selling construction LURs in collective land shall be deposited in an account 
designated for the provision of social security benefits for collective members, which of course raises the 
question of what collective leaders are likely to do with the other half. Id. art. 25. 
162
 See Stein, supra note 15, at 44-46.  Certain language in the Decision on Major Issues suggests an 
interest on the part of the Chinese Communist Party in permitting commercial development on rural land 
(expressing support for “approving non-public-use building projects on collectively-owned agricultural 
land” and for “gradually establishing unified markets for urban and rural land”).  Yet that document also 
expresses a commitment to maintaining the amount of agricultural land at current levels, and to “not 
changing the collectively-owned nature or the current use” of agricultural land subject to market 
transactions in land-use rights.  Decision on Major Issues, supra note 28.  
163
 Supra Part III.A. 
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regulation seeks to do precisely this), they are bound to impose outsized 
burdens on the owners of land currently designated for such use.  In this way, 
Chinese farmers and collectives are no different from the unlucky owners of 
undeveloped open space in American jurisdictions that have made a priority 
of preserving that particular land use.164 
This comparison suggests another way of thinking about the 
expropriation problem:  the harm to farmers of the current system does not 
actually originate with the expropriation process but is instead at least 
partially a result of the burdens that the current land use regulation system 
imposes on them in order to provide benefits to the rest of Chinese society.  
The recognition of these burdens clearly inspires proposals to revamp the 
current land use regulation system altogether; but those proposals ignore the 
benefits that these land use regulations seek to provide. 165  The best solution, 
therefore, may not be to eliminate the system entirely but instead to seek to 
mitigate its effects.  For these ends, the doctrine of regulatory takings can 
prove extremely useful. 
The import of my reference to the doctrine of regulatory takings 
should not be misunderstood.  Under American constitutional law, it is a 
mandatory requirement that officials compensate citizens for regulations 
that completely or unfairly diminish the value of their property.166  No such 
requirement exists in Chinese law.  My application of regulatory takings 
theory here is not a legal analysis.  Rather, it is a policy analysis.  As such, it 
takes its cue from analyses of American regulatory takings doctrine that 
justify that doctrine as much with reference to universally desirable 
functions such as “efficiency” and “justice” as with reference to American 
constitutional law.  My conclusion is not that compensation for a regulatory 
taking is currently necessary under Chinese law; instead, it is that such 
compensation is desirable from a prudential standpoint. 
 Both Frank Michelman’s canonical analysis of takings jurisprudence 
and Heller and Krier’s expansion on that analysis received attention in Part 
III.B., above.  These scholars’ perspectives were used in part to understand 
the negative effects of the current expropriation compensation system.  In 
fact, though, neither analysis originated as an attempt to understand the 
optimal compensation due when property is taken by eminent domain.  
                                                 
164
 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Counc., 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
165
 It is true that the benefits of those regulations are dampened somewhat by the ongoing process of 
expropriation and urbanization of rural land.  However, to the extent that the proposal in Part V of this 
Article reduces the expropriation surplus, that proposal furthers the preservation of agricultural land and the 
maintenance of farmers’ livelihoods that are the ostensible goals of those regulations. 
166
 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Counc., 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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Instead, both analyses are focused more on the questions that are integral to 
the doctrine of regulatory takings—the question of how much compensation 
is due is secondary to the question of whether a taking has occurred, and 
whether any compensation is due at all.167 
 The purpose of the regulatory takings doctrine, according to Heller 
and Krier, is to ensure both efficiency and justice in the administration of 
government programs that burden particular individuals.  It was established 
above that the current system of compensation for expropriation of rural 
land—comparable to takings by eminent domain—falls short in the justice 
area.  This is due in substantial part to the expropriation surplus, which is in 
turn created by the land use regulations applicable to rural land.  The key 
question now is whether those regulations also fail to serve those same goals 
and hence constitute a regulatory taking. 
 Heller and Krier present the efficiency of any government policy as a 
threshold question for determining whether or not the entity promulgating 
the policy should be required to compensate those constituents who bear its 
costs.  The idea is that a compensation requirement will serve a deterrence 
function with respect to governments, ensuring that they will institute such 
costly measures only when the benefits of doing so truly outweigh the costs. 
168
  For reasons discussed above, this Article will not take the position that 
the urban/rural divide with respect to land policy is an inefficient measure 
that should be discouraged by a payment requirement imposed upon the 
Chinese national government, which is responsible for that divide.  For one 
thing, evaluating the relative benefits and costs of that policy is well beyond 
the purview of this piece.  For another, the policy certainly seems a 
reasonable response to a concern for the preservation of agricultural land 
(even though the expropriation system undermines the value of that 
response), and once that concern becomes a policy goal, it is unavoidable 
that any implementing measure would disadvantage the users and occupiers 
of the land that is sought to be preserved.   
 The fairness of the urban/rural distinction, however, is readily 
susceptible to analysis here.  In American jurisprudence on regulatory 
takings, a concern with fairness or justice usually manifests itself as a focus 
on two issues: first, the extent to which a regulation diminishes the value of 
private property;169 second, the way in which a regulation distributes the 
burdens and benefits of a particular government policy among different 
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 Heller & Krier, supra note 71; Michelman, supra note 71, at 1165. 
168
 Id. at 999. 
169
 E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Counc., 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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citizens or interest groups.170  The first issue is of little interest here:  the 
Chinese policy does not render collectively-owned land completely 
valueless, nor does it actually reduce the value of agricultural land from a 
previous higher level.  Instead, it merely prevents a certain degree of 
appreciation of value, at least while that land is in the hands of its current 
owners.  However, the second issue strikes precisely at the heart of what 
renders these restrictions so troublesome. 
The distinction between state-owned and collectively-owned land is 
starkly unfair in its distribution of burdens and benefits among various 
members of Chinese society.  First, the basic benefits of preserving 
agricultural land—environmental impacts and security of the food supply—
accrue to the entirety of society, but only rural citizens bear the burdens.  
The expropriation surplus created by this distinction only enhances this 
imbalance, because expropriation generally results in an additional windfall 
for private developers—presumably non-farmers—who purchase rights to 
newly expropriated land at bargain prices.  One could question this analysis 
by pointing to the way in which, in recent years, Chinese commentators have 
cited preserving the livelihood and well-being of farmers and other rural 
residents as an argument for preserving farmland through these 
restrictions.171  However, as discussed above,172 that argument looks quite 
weak given the ability of local governments to expropriate.  Picking up on 
other themes raised above, the most productive way of viewing this situation, 
given the expropriation possibility, might be to treat local governments as 
constituents of the central government just as individual land users are.  The 
current land use regulations coupled with the law of expropriation 
essentially give local governments an option on the urbanization surplus.  
This represents a clear benefit to these entities, and that benefit is 
simultaneously a burden on collectives and the farmers they represent. 
Second, the current regulations restrict the potential use of land based 
not on its current use, as many land use restrictions do, but on the basis of 
who owns it.  Even non-agricultural land may only be developed by a limited 
range of parties or for a limited range of purposes if it is owned by 
collectives rather than the state.  Finally, the restrictions burden a class of 
citizens—farmers and other rural residents—whose incomes and access to 
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 E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
171
 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
172
 Supra Part III.B.1. 
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social entitlements are, despite their numbers, markedly less than those of 
urban residents.173 
Can a regulatory regime whose main fault is an unfair distribution of 
burdens and benefits constitute a regulatory taking?  American regulatory 
takings jurisprudence would likely answer that question in the negative,174 
but American constitutional doctrine should not be the touchstone here.  
According to the policy-based analysis of Heller and Krier, a significant 
failing of American regulatory takings jurisprudence is that it has failed to 
“uncouple” efficiency concerns from justice concerns in determining when a 
taking has occurred.175  Compensation for takings serves a dual purpose.  On 
the one hand, forcing governments to pay for certain regulations discourages 
inefficient government action.  On the other, assigning payment to aggrieved 
citizens ensures fairness in the distribution of the burdens and benefits of 
regulation.  Yet, there is no reason why a given regulation must require both 
payment by the government and payment to burdened citizens.  According to 
Heller and Krier, situations may occur in which payment by the government 
is necessary to ensure efficiency, but distribution of those payments to 
citizens would entail more administrative costs than it might be worth.  
Conversely, in other situations, efficiency concerns that would justify 
payment by the government may not exist, but aggrieved citizens may still 
be entitled to compensation.176 
This analysis is uniquely applicable to the distinction in Chinese land 
use law that creates the expropriation surplus.  This policy is unfair but does 
not lend itself to an efficiency analysis.  It is hard to find a compelling 
reason why this policy, instead of many others, should require payment by 
the government.  It does, however, create unfair distinctions among Chinese 
                                                 
173
 In the United States, the size of the affected group is often treated as an index of its political power 
and thus as inversely related to its vulnerability to regulatory takings.  However, in a non-voting-based 
political system like China’s, that assumption is not valid.  E.g., Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just 
Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 305-06 (1990). 
174
 The American rule is that regulations that physically invade an owner’s land or render that land 
valueless are regulatory takings.  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.  Regulations that do neither may still be takings based on a more ambiguous 
balancing test that, however, does not emphasize distribution of burdens and benefits and instead focuses 
on the character of the government action and its economic impact on the landowner.  Penn Central Trans. 
Co., 438 U.S. at 123-29. 
175
 Heller & Krier, supra note 71, at 997. 
176
 Id. at 999-1005.  Heller and Krier divide all regulations into four categories, two of which are not 
currently recognized by American courts.  The two which are recognized by American courts are those that 
do not constitute a taking and for which no compensation is due, and those that do constitute a taking and 
for which compensation is due.  The two remaining categories, which Heller and Krier urge courts to 
recognize, are takings for which no compensation is due, and non-takings for which compensation is due.  
Id. 
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citizens for which some compensation ought to be paid.  This policy is a 
regulatory taking insofar as compensation is owed to citizens, but it is not a 
taking for which compensation by the government is owed.  This is a novel 
category, to be sure, and one that does not properly exist in American 
takings jurisprudence, though there is some evidence that this category is 
recognized by German courts.177 
How can Chinese farmers be compensated for the use restrictions on 
collective land without payment by the Chinese government?  In Part V.C., 
below, I propose that compensation for farmers who bear this land use 
burden should consist of transferable development rights that, at least up 
front, will not cost governments anything to provide. 
 
C. Compensation for Regulatory Takings 
 
The discussions above point to two major goals for pre-expropriation 
(regulatory takings) compensation for Chinese farmers.  First, because a 
deterrence analysis based on efficiency does not yield a clear verdict on the 
Chinese land use system, one cannot assert that governments should have to 
supply the compensation that is due.  Second, that compensation should be 
designed so that, when actual takings—expropriation of collective land—do 
occur, the urbanization surplus should not fall entirely or mostly into the 
hands of local governments; instead, some of it should end up instead in the 
hands of farmers.  The regulatory takings analysis in Part V.B. answers the 
vexing question of why farmers deserve a portion of the 
expropriation/urbanization surplus:  although they do not generate the 
economic development that produces the surplus, they generate value in 
other (involuntary) ways, through compliance with economically onerous 
land use restrictions. 
A crucial remaining question, though, is how much of the 
urbanization surplus should go to each of farmers, collectives, local 
governments, and developers.  Were it not for the dual ownership system, 
and the requirement that the state intervene by expropriating land whenever 
land is to be converted from rural to urban uses, farmers, collectives, and 
developers might arrange for that division themselves, through market 
transactions.  An ideal system would be one that allowed, to the greatest 
extent possible, simulation of the results of market transactions.  The 
following proposal may accomplish just that. 
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 Id. at 1012 n. 63.  
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1. Create, By Statute,Transferable Rural Land Development Rights 178   
 
Rural land development Rights (“RLDRs”) do not represent the 
current right to develop land.  Instead, they represent the right to develop the 
land if it is converted to state ownership and, consequently, becomes subject 
to the less restrictive land use regime. 
The RLDRs will attach only to collectively-owned land that is 
currently being used for any purpose, either by the collective owner or 
pursuant to rural LURs.  They will also attach to formerly unused 
collectively-owned land as soon as it is converted to some sort of use. 
 
2. Assign RLDRs, by Contracts Similar to Those Used for Rural LURs, 
to the Current Users of Collective Land   
 
 Collectives will receive RLDRs for every parcel of land they are 
currently using for public facilities or TVE facilities.  Meanwhile, farming 
households will receive RLDRs to accompany each piece of land to which 
they hold use rights for either agricultural use or their own housing.  
It is only rational that land users (farmers) rather than owners 
(collectives) receive RLDRs.  RLDRs are essentially a form of use rights—
the right to use newly-expropriated land for the sorts of purposes reserved to 
state-owned land.  Moreover, farmers and not collectives, which are not 
even legal persons under Chinese law, are the parties directly harmed by 
national law’s distinctions between the permissible uses of collective land 
and the permissible uses of state-owned land.  RLDRs represent an 
appropriate form of compensation for the regulatory taking that is imposed 
upon rural citizens by that distinction—appropriate in part because they 
move the system away from one of ad hominem land use regulation.  With 
RLDRs, collective agricultural land will be unavailable for development by 
virtue of the fact that it is currently used for agriculture, as is the case today; 
however, it will not be the case that its current (agricultural) users are denied 
                                                 
178
 This proposal is by no means entirely original.  Several Chinese scholars have in recent years 
offered proposals for reform that are based around the granting of rural land development rights to farmers.  
None of these proposals are as detailed as this one, however, nor are any identical to it.  Dai Zhongliang & 
Yang Jingqiu, supra note 63, at 27 (proposing that LDRs be granted only to non-agricultural collective land, 
and that upon expropriation LDRs be included in the compensation formula rather than purchased by new 
commercial users); Hou Huali & Du Juan, supra note 67, at 78-79 (offering a less detailed proposal very 
much like this one, but excluding the possibility of market sales of RLDRs outside of the expropriation 
context); Liu Zuoxiang, supra note 59, at 92 (arguing that farmers should be given LDRs to the land that 
they currently use but proposing no detailed mechanism for doing so).  
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any share in the potential surplus that will be generated if the land is 
converted to urban uses. 
 
3. Establish, Through Amendment of the LAL, the RLCL, and the 
Property Law, for the Sale and Possibly the Mortgage of RLDRs   
 
 Provisions for the market circulation of RLDRs should resemble those 
for rural LURs.  All transactions must be reported to local governments, and 
the price paid must be included in the reports.  
While the introduction of a transferable abstract right in land into a 
relatively unsophisticated rural economy may sound a bit cumbersome, in 
fact such a process is likely to be easier and smoother in rural China than 
elsewhere.  After all, transferable LURs have been a feature of the Chinese 
rural economy for years now, and recent data shows that market transactions 
in these rights have been increasing in number in recent years, thus 
indicating an increasingly widespread understanding of these rights.179 
The hope is that this reform will lead to a market in RLDRs to 
collective land that is not certain or even expected to be expropriated in the 
near future.  For instance, the purchase of RLDRs to land in a village that is 
not far from an expanding major city may strike speculators or developers as 
a potentially lucrative gamble.  These speculators or developers might then 
bargain with farmers or collectives who would prefer to earn cash in the near 
term.  Then the speculators or developers could turn a profit if the land were 
expropriated in the future, and would likely sustain a loss if the land were 
never expropriated.  This would allow farmers to monetize their RLDRs 
even if their land remains in the collective system indefinitely. 
  
4. RLDRs Required for Development   
 
 It should be established, through amendment of the LAL, the RLCL, 
and the Property Law, that land that is currently collectively-owned may not 
be developed for commercial purposes, including for TVEs, rural housing, 
and public facilities, unless the developer holds RLDRs in that land.  This 
will mean, for example, that a collective seeking to build a TVE or public 
facility may not reclaim agricultural land from a farmer who holds LURs in 
that land without first purchasing the farmer’s RLDRs.  While collective 
reclamation of land for these purposes ought not to be a major problem at 
present, given that collectives are forbidden by law from violating LUR 
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 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
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contracts except in special circumstances,180 this provision will still provide 
an extra line of defense for farmers against unscrupulous or abusive 
collectives. 
 
5. Endurance of RLDRs Despite Expropriation   
 
 It should be established, through amendment of the LAL, the RLCL, 
the Property Law, and possibly an amendment to Article 10, that RLDRs 
may not be expropriated by the state except in cases in which the land to 
which they attach is simultaneously expropriated for public, non-profit 
purposes, 181 and that, unlike rural LURs, RLDRs are not extinguished when 
collective land is expropriated.  
 
6. Expropriation for Non-Public or Profit-Bearing Purposes   
 
 Local governments may still expropriate land for profit-bearing 
purposes, as there will still be no other legal means of changing the use 
regime applicable to that land.  However, the rights expropriated, or 
extinguished by expropriation, will not include RLDRs.  Local governments 
must compensate farmers and collectives according to the statutory formula 
and may then sell LURs to commercial users.  However, these same 
commercial users must also purchase RLDRs from their holders before they 
will be permitted to develop the land.182  Similarly, if local governments 
expropriate collective land for commercial development in which they will 
                                                 
180
 RLCL, supra note 25, at arts. 14(1), 27.  Contracts may be altered only if the land is damaged by a 
natural disaster, and even in these cases alterations must be approved by two-thirds of villagers’ 
representatives and by both the township and county government.  Id. at art. 27. See also Property Law, 
supra note 14, at arts. 131-132; LAL, supra note 25, at art. 14; Land Contract Law Aims to Protect 
Farmers Interests, PEOPLE’S DAILY, June 27, 2001, available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200106/27/eng20010627_73603.html. 
181
 Even in such cases, compensation for the expropriated RLDRs will be required, as is discussed 
below. 
182
 One potential concern here is that these transactions may occur against a backdrop of unequal 
information between farmers and developers.  For example, developers may persuade local governments to 
agree to expropriate land but not to publicize their plans to do so until after the developers have purchased 
all the RLDRs they need.  This may allow the developers to obtain the RLDRs at a lower price than farmers 
would have accepted had they known that the expropriation of LURs was certain to occur and thus that the 
developers needed, and were not simply speculating on, the RLDRs.  This is a legitimate concern.  But it is 
one that is hard to answer without measures that will limit farmers’ rights to sell and bargain for their 
RLDRs as they choose.  Moreover, if information about markets in RLDRs spreads relatively easily, there 
is a good chance that the overall effects of this phenomenon will be neutral for both farmers and 
developers/speculators, as farmers will begin to demand higher prices for RLDRs whether expropriation 
plans have been made public or not, and the price of RLDRs in situations where no expropriation plan 
exists and the purchase is purely speculative will rise.   
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be a main participant (either by developing the land themselves or by acting 
as a joint venture partner), they will be required to negotiate a price for the 
RLDRs with their current holders.  
 This portion of the proposal serves several goals at once.  First, it 
assures that the elimination of the expropriation surplus will not completely 
deprive local governments of what has been a particularly valuable source of 
income for their operations.  Local governments are still free to earn a profit 
off of expropriation, by charging new users a higher price for urban LURs 
than what they were expected to pay under the statutory compensation 
formula.  
At the same time, though, this process should ensure that the 
expropriation surplus will be reduced.  New users of newly-urbanized land 
will need to buy RLDRs from their current holder before they will be able to 
develop their land.  This decreases the expropriation surplus, which will 
presumably make local governments less likely to expropriate, reduce the 
rate of peasant displacement (in keeping with the stated goals of the dual 
land ownership regime), and possibly, to the extent that local governments 
do expropriate more frequently than is efficient or optimal at present, bring 
more market discipline into the process. 183  
Moreover, in a sense, this process allows the market to determine the 
amount by which the expropriation surplus will, and should, be reduced.  
Private commercial developers will need to pay two prices—one to gain 
basic rights to a parcel of land, the other to gain the right to develop that 
parcel for a particular use.  Public or semi-public (public-private joint 
ventures) developers will need to pay the second price only (on top of the 
statutory compensation due to collectives upon expropriation).  The relative 
prices that commercial developers will be willing to pay for LURs and 
RLDRs will provide potentially useful information to governments and 
market participants about the fundamentals underlying land prices in China 
today.  
 
7. Expropriation for Non-Profit Public Purposes   
 
 Local governments would still be permitted to expropriate collective 
land for any of an enumerated list of non-profit public purposes, including 
                                                 
183
 If in fact the rate of expropriation does go down, or if the prices developers are willing to pay for 
newly urbanized land decrease due to the requirement that they separately purchase RLDRs, then it is likely 
that a key source of local government revenue will be reduced.  On the other hand, there is also a chance 
that local governments will be able to make up some of the difference by charging higher prices to 
developers.  In any event, the reduction of this revenue stream is a side effect of any proposal to shift some 
of the expropriation surplus to farmers or to reduce the pace of rural expropriation. 
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construction of government buildings, power plants, highways, and state-run 
schools.  Compensation for the lost ownership rights of collectives, and the 
lost agricultural LURs of farmers, would be required based on the existing 
statutory formula.  
However, in addition, compensation will also be required to 
compensate land users for their temporarily unexercisable RLDRs.  Ideally, 
this compensation should consist of a new set of RLDRs, in a parcel of 
comparable size to that expropriated, located in the same village, if possible, 
or the same county, if not.  This option may not be available, however, as 
RLDRs to all comparable land may already be assigned to other users.  Thus, 
barring the availability of this option, compensation should be the fair 
market value of the RLDRs.  In the absence of extensive market data, fair 
market value determinations will be by no means easy to make in the first 
few years of the system’s operation, or perhaps for a long time after.  Clear 
statutory guidelines should therefore be provided.  These should establish 
that the market value of RLDRs will be derived by finding the average price 
per mu paid in market sales of RLDRs in the geographical area where this 
expropriation is occurring.  This average price should be based on at least 
ten such transactions, and the transactions from which the average should be 
derived must have taken place in the jurisdictions of comparable size nearest 
to the current transaction.  
 
8. Provide, Through Amendment of the LAL, the RLCL, and the Property 
Law, for “Optional Expropriation” of Non-Agricultural Collective 
Land   
 
 Collectives will be given an option by statute to force local 
governments to “expropriate,” without compensation, non-agricultural land 
to which they hold RLDRs, so long as two-thirds of the collectives’ 
members agree.  Farmers may also exercise this option, with the permission 
of their collectives, for non-agricultural land to which they hold RLDRs, i.e., 
land they are currently using for their own housing.  Collectives would lose 
ownership rights, and farmers would use their use rights, to the expropriated 
land if this option is exercised.  However, collectives or farmers would then 
be able to sell the RLDRs in that land to a commercial user who wished to 
purchase urban LURs to that land from the state and develop it for other 
purposes.  
This provision recognizes that the value of the dual ownership system 
and related use restrictions is rather limited with regards to collectively-
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owned land that is already developed for non-agricultural purposes.  
Allowing collectives and farmers to transfer this land to the state ownership 
system at their own discretion allows these parties to share in the profits 
from urbanization.  In practice, though, given the fact that compensation will 
not be required, it seems unlikely that many collectives or farmers will 
exercise this option, unless the profits to be gained from selling RLDRs to 
commercial users were likely to be quite extraordinary.  Thus, this provision 
is unlikely to lead to a massive exodus of land out of the collective system 
and is instead likely to be relevant only in areas of extremely rapid 
urbanization and rapid increases in property values.  
In summation, the RLDR scheme just described will solve multiple 
vexing problems with the current system.  It will reduce the expropriation 
surplus by ensuring that local governments do not enjoy the entirety of the 
urbanization surplus, and thereby reduce the demoralization costs resulting 
from the size of the expropriation surplus.  It will ensure that some of the 
urbanization surplus accrues to farmers, settling some of the justice concerns 
that plague the current expropriation system.  Also, it will alleviate some of 
the unfairness of the land use regulation system, which precedes and is 
independent of any actual acts of land expropriation.  RLDRs are a means of 
ensuring that farmers are compensated for the initial, crucial unfairness that 
results from Chinese land use law, without requiring governments to pay to 
enforce a policy in pursuit of somewhat nebulous concepts of efficient 
regulation.  While a transfer of wealth from local governments and 
developers to farmers will occur under this proposal, it will occur through a 
mechanism that is complex and flexible enough to be an appropriate solution 
to a problem whose own complexity goes well beyond the relatively simple 
concept of a taking by eminent domain.  
 This proposal comes at what is perhaps an inopportune moment.  It 
has only been a few short years since China passed its comprehensive 
Property Law and, in doing so, affirmed the broad parameters of the current 
system governing ownership, use, and expropriation of rural land.  That does 
not mean, however, that opportunities for reform do not exist in the short 
term.  In recent years, provincial and other local governments have taken the 
lead in proposing and implementing changes to the current system.184  The 
RLDR proposal could be implemented on that level.  Particularly in a 
province like Guangdong that has relatively well-developed markets in rural 
land already, such implementation might actually be more effective than the 
unlikely event of national reform along these lines in the near future. 
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 The unusually protracted and inflammatory debate over the Property 
Law is not irrelevant to the import of this article’s analysis.  One of the more 
heated debates about that statute involved a proposal to allow farmers to 
mortgage their LURs.185  Both the proponents and the opponents of that 
proposal were motivated largely by concern for the standard of living of 
Chinese farmers and social stability in China.  The proponents emphasized 
that the ability to monetize LURs could be a potentially powerful tool of 
wealth generation for farmers; but the eventually successful opponents, 
generally leftists, were concerned with the possibility of farmers losing their 
land in even greater numbers than at present.  This concern resonates both 
with an ideological interest in preserving the remnants of leftist agrarianism 
in the Chinese system and with very justifiable worries about social stability.  
Also, this concern informs, directly or indirectly, some of the unfortunate 
characteristics of the current rural land regime, including the inability of 
farmers to sell their LURs to parties who are not other farmers.  
 RLDRs, much more than most proposals offered by Western scholars 
in this area, represent an accommodation to that concern, in the context of 
both the mortgage question and the land use question.  RLDRs will afford 
farmers some ability to monetize their land rights, but without running the 
risk of losing those rights entirely to foreclosure.  Similarly, they will allow 
farmers to share in the urbanization surplus but will not eliminate the legal 
ability of the state to limit the pace of urbanization if it begins to perceive 
landless farmers as too large a threat to social stability.  RLDRs also 
represent a means of expanding farmers’ access to the market value of their 
land without abridging the social security function of the compensation they 
receive when their land is taken, discussed in Part III.C.2. above.  In all of 
these contexts, RLDRs represent a compromise solution that moderates 
between several different and possibly conflicting goals, and between 
opposing political forces.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 The discussion above is intended to suggest a broad new approach to 
the Chinese rural land problem.  Much discussion of this problem by 
American scholars to date, as shown in Part IV. of this article, has tended to 
conclude that the standards of American eminent domain law—fair market 
value compensation, public use requirements—are the most likely source of 
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solutions to this problem.  This article, in contrast, takes a different approach, 
one that is intended to be more sensitive to the Chinese legal background, 
political context, and system of land ownership. 
 My analysis of the background legal regime has shown that 
expropriation of land by the state cannot be treated as an extraordinary event, 
given the underlying land use and ownership system, but must instead be 
accepted as the necessary (barring constitutional change) legal vehicle for 
urbanization.  However, that does not mean that the surplus value to be 
gained from urbanization must be entirely allocated to the parties doing the 
expropriating.  The fact that the urbanization surplus has become an 
expropriation surplus under the current system has led to severe negative 
consequences.  A fiscal analysis that treats governments as financially 
motivated actors fails to illuminate those consequences, in part because the 
act of expropriation by local governments may well be efficient.  However, 
it is clear that the expropriation process as it currently exists produces 
profound demoralization costs that are expressed in social unrest; these costs 
may well be the result not just of absolutely low sums given as 
compensation but of the existence of the expropriation surplus.  Moreover, 
the unfairness of the current policy is a product as much of underlying land 
use entitlements as of the occurrence of expropriation.  The analogy to a 
regulatory taking helps to illuminate this reasoning, and supports a proposal 
that gives Chinese farmers compensatory development rights that predate 
and are, to some extent, independent of the actual act of expropriation.  
RLDRs can be monetized even if no expropriation takes place; they 
represent a means by which farmers can share in both the realized and the 
unrealized urbanization surplus.  
   
 
 
